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This paper presents a canonical, econometric model of contagion
and investigates the conditions under which contagion can be distin-
guished from inter-dependence. In a two-country (market) set up it
is shown that for a range of fundamentals the solution is not unique,
and for suﬃciently large values of the contagion coeﬃcients it has in-
teresting bifurcation properties with bimodal density functions. The
extension of the model to herding behaviour is also brieﬂy discussed.
To identify contagion eﬀects in the presence of inter-dependencies the
equations for the individual markets or countries must contain coun-
try (market) speciﬁc forcing variables. This sheds doubt on the general
validity of the correlation based tests of contagions recently proposed
in the literature which do not involve any country (market) speciﬁc
fundamentals. Finally, we show that ignoring inter-dependence can in-
troduce an upward bias in the estimate of the contagion coeﬃcient, and
using Monte Carlo experiments we further show that this bias could
be substantial.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent episodes of ﬁnancial crises suggest that they appear in clusters. In
the EMS crises in 1992 two countries were forced to leave the exchange
rate mechanism and a number of other countries suﬀered from speculative
attacks. In 1994 a number of countries were aﬀected in what came to be
known as the “Tequila” crisis. During the Asian crisis in 1997, several Asian
economies were struck by severe crises. These episodes have led economists
to suggest that ﬁnancial crises are contagious, that they spread from the
originating country to other countries, and that an understanding of the
reasons for contagion is essential for forming appropriate economic policies.
The theoretical literature considers a number of reasons for ﬁnancial
crises to appear in clusters. Masson (1999) identiﬁes three categories under
which the diﬀerent theories can be subsumed. First, the theory of “mon-
soonal eﬀects” suggests that ﬁnancial crises appear to be contagious because
the underlying macroeconomic causes are correlated. Second, ﬁnancial crises
may be transmitted between countries via “spill-overs”: a crisis aﬀects an-
other country through external links such as trade. A devaluation in one
country exerts pressure on the country’s trading partners to devalue. Fi-
nally, the theory of “pure contagion” holds that the market jumps from a
“good” to a “bad” equilibrium. The jump could be caused by a reversal in
a long-standing information cascade. A ﬁnancial crisis in one country could
be considered a signal that, for example, a certain type of economic devel-
opment strategy is unsustainable. Investors would withdraw their money
from countries with apparently similar development strategies and cause a
cluster of ﬁnancial crises.
The ﬁrst two cases, monsoonal eﬀects and spill-overs, are examples of
inter-dependence. Crises resulting from inter-dependence should be largely
predictable using macroeconomic fundamentals. If the inter-dependence
during non-crises periods is known, the eﬀect of a ﬁnancial crisis in one
country on the likelihood of a crisis in another country can be evaluated.
The third case, jumps between equilibria, is what we refer to as contagion in
this paper: a largely unpredictable, higher correlation during crises times.
This deﬁnition of contagion means that a crisis in one country increases
the likelihood of a crisis in another country over and above what would be
implied by the inter-dependence that prevails between these countries in
non-crises times. This deﬁnition corresponds to that given by Forbes and
Rigobon (2001, 2002).
There are important implications of the distinction between contagion
and inter-dependence. Investors need to take a diﬀerent kind of risk into
account for their portfolio choices if markets have a higher correlation after
negative shocks. If negative shocks have a much higher correlation across
countries than in tranquil times, diversiﬁcation of portfolios across countries
might be less useful than anticipated before a negative shock.
2Economic policy-makers need to be aware of the source of contagion
when they are evaluating possible policy responses to a crisis. If the cause
of a crisis is a random jump between equilibria, i.e. contagion, international
institutional lending to prevent contagion could be a highly eﬀective response
as it might return the market to the “good” equilibrium. If, in contrast, a
crisis spreads to other countries because their fundamentals are correlated
or there are spill-overs aﬀecting the economic fundamentals, international
institutional lending cannot prevent the crisis unless it is large enough to
change the fundamentals.
There is a large body of empirical research regarding the source of conta-
gion of ﬁnancial crises, recently reviewed by Dornbusch, Park, and Claessen
(2000), Pericoli and Sbracia (2002), and Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo
and Martin (2003). The empirical literature on contagion of currency crises
has been largely based on the literature on the macroeconomic causes of
currency crises. Using a panel data set, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz
(ERW) (1996) used a pooled probit model to explain a binary indicator of
currency crises by a set of macroeconomic variables and a dummy variable
for contagion. They found that a crisis elsewhere raises the likelihood of a
currency crises by about 8% and interpreted this ﬁnding as an indication
of contagion. Similar studies have also been carried out by Esquivel and
Larraín (1998), Kruger, Osakwe, and Page (1998), Stone and Weeks (2001),
and Kumar, Moorthy, and Perraudin (2002).
Another set of papers examines contagion of ﬁnancial markets by test-
ing for higher correlation between markets during crises times (King and
Wadhwani (1990), Boyer, Gibson, and Loretan (1999), Loretan and Eng-
lish (2000), Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia
(2002)). Favero and Giavazzi (2002) found signiﬁcant contagion dummies in
their analysis of interest rate spreads in the ERM. Bae, Karolyi and Stulz
(2003) test whether the number of contemporaneous extreme stock market
returns across a number of markets in a given region can be explained by
three common factors, and ﬁnd that the average exchange rate in the re-
gion, the average interest rate in the region, and the conditional volatility
of a regional stock market index are signiﬁcant.
In this paper we propose a canonical model of contagion and provide a
solution in the two country (asset) set up. For a range of fundamentals the
solution is not unique and for suﬃciently large values of the contagion coeﬃ-
cients has interesting bifurcation properties with bimodal density functions.
We brieﬂy discuss extensions of this model to cover herding behaviour.
The problem of identiﬁc a t i o na n de s t i m a t i o no ft h ec o n t a g i o nc o e ﬃ-
cients are discussed and shown to be an example of the general problem
of inference in the non-linear simultaneous equation models. To identify
contagion eﬀects in the presence of inter-dependencies the equations for the
individual markets or countries must contain country (market) speciﬁcf o r c -
ing variables. Therefore, pure correlation-based tests for contagion cannot
3be valid. Country speciﬁc fundamentals are needed to distinguish contagion
from inter-dependence. The correlation based tests of contagions recently
proposed in the literature attempts to overcome the identiﬁcation problem
by assuming that the crises periods can be identiﬁed (or known ap r i o r i ),
and that such episodes are suﬃciently prolonged and contiguous so that
cross-country (market) correlations during crisis and non-crisis periods can
be consistently estimated and compared. These are strong assumptions that
are unlikely to hold in practice and their implementation tend to be subject
to the sample selection bias. Such correlation analyses, by being ex post in
nature, are also not very helpful if the focus of the analysis is to develop an
early warning system for policy use.
Finally, we show that ignoring the endogeneity of the contagion indicator
and/or inter-dependence of the error terms can introduce an upward bias in
t h ee s t i m a t eo ft h ec o n t a g i o nc o e ﬃcient, and using Monte Carlo experiments
we further show that this bias could be substantial. Our simulations also
s u g g e s tt h a tt h ec o n t a g i o nc o e ﬃcient of 0.54 obtained from pooled probit
estimation of ERW’s model could be due to neglected inter-dependencies
rather than contagion.
2 A Canonical Model of Contagion: A Two Coun-
try Framework
Consider the following relations
y1t = δ0
1zt + α0
1x1t + β1I(y2t − c2σ2,t−1)+u1t (1)
y2t = δ0
2zt + α0
2x2t + β2I(y1t − c1σ1,t−1)+u2t, (2)
where yit is a performance indicator for country i =1 ,2, t =1 ,...,T,
u1t and u2t are serially uncorrelated errors with zero means, conditional
variances σ2
u1,t−1 and σ2
u2,t−1 and a non-zero correlation coeﬃcient ρ.1 The
regressors, xit, are ki×1 country-speciﬁc observed factors assumed to be pre-
determined and distributed independently of ujt for all i and j.C o u n t r y -
speciﬁc dynamics can be allowed for by including yi,t−1,y i,t−2,... in xit.
zt is an s × 1 vector of pre-determined observed common factors, such as
international oil prices, or other common features. I(A) is an indicator
function that takes the value of unity if A>0 and zero otherwise
σ2
i,t−1 = Var(yit | Ωt−1),
Ωt−1 is the information available at time t − 1.2
1In the analysis of the solution properties of y1t and y2t it is relatively easy to allow
f o rp o s s i b l et i m ev a r i a t i o n si nρ. But such a generalisation could obscure the properties
of the correlation between y1t and y2t.A si ti ss h o w nb e l o wCorr(y1t,y 2t) could be time
varying even if ρ is ﬁxed.





4Examples of performance indicators include stock market returns used
by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2002), and
the index of “exchange market pressure” employed by Eichengreen, Rose and
Wylosz (1996) which is a weighted average of exchange rate depreciation,
interest rate diﬀerential and international reserves ratios. We are assuming
that yit is deﬁn e di ns u c haw a yt h a tac r i s i si sa s s o c i a t e dw i t he x t r e m e
positive values of yit,a n dci > 0.
In this set up inter-dependence is captured through non-zero values of ρ,
and is distinguished from contagion eﬀects characterised by non-zero values
of βi.
• It is assumed that contagion takes place only at times of crises, whilst
inter-dependence is the result of normal market interactions.3
• Country i is said to be in crisis if the performance index, yit rises above
a threshold value cit.
• Contagion is said to occur if a crisis in country 2 increases the probabil-
ity of a crisis in country 1 over and above the usual market interactions,
and vice versa.
• To test for contagion we ﬁrst need to establish conditions under which
the contagion coeﬃcients, βi can be identiﬁed. Once such conditions
are met, a test of contagion in country i can be carried out by testing
βi =0against the one-sided alternatives, βi > 0.




ixit + βiUI(yjt − cjUσj,t−1)+βiLI(−yjt − cjLσj,t−1)+uit,
for i =1 ,2,w h e r eβiU and βiL now refer to contagion eﬀects on the upper
and the lower tails and cjUσj,t−1 and cjLσj,t−1 are the associated thresholds
with cjU ≥ 0 and cjL ≥ 0. It is clear that only one of the indicators can be
triggered at a time. In this note we shall focus on the relatively simple case
where βiL =0 , but we conjecture that our approach and arguments can be
readily extended to the more general case.
3Such phenomena are also frequently encountered in physics and have been studied
extensively in the literature on bifurcation and chaos. For example, in the Rayleigh-
Bénard convection, heat from the surface of the earth conducts its way to the top of the
atmosphere until the rate of heat generation at the surface of the earth gets too high.
At this point heat conduction breaks down. The atmosphere develops pairs of convection
cells, one rotating left and the other rotating right.






we re-write (1)a n d( 2 )a s
y1t = w1t + β1I(y2t − c2), (3)
y2t = w2t + β2I(y1t − c1), (4)
where to simplify the notations and without loss of generality we abstract
from the (possibly) time varying nature of the thresholds.
This is a system of non-linear and non-diﬀerentiable simultaneous equa-
tions and has a simple unique solution when either β1 or β2 is zero. For
example, suppose that β2 =0 . Then the solution is given by
y1t = w1t + β1I(y2t − c2), (5)
y2t = w2t. (6)
When neither of the contagion coeﬃcients is zero the equation system
(3) and (4) can be equivalently written as
Y1t = W1t +I (Y2t), (7)









To solve this simpliﬁed system we shall consider the following ﬁve mutually
and exclusive regions in the (W1t,W 2t) plane (see also Figure 1):
Region A: W2t > 0
Region B: −1 <W 2t ≤ 0 and W1t > 0,
Region C: W2t ≤− 1
Region D: −1 <W 2t ≤ 0 and W1t < −1
Region E: −1 <W 2t ≤ 0 and −1 <W 1t ≤ 0
It is now easily veriﬁed that in regions A and B, the solution for Y1t is
unique and is given by
Y ∗
1t =1+W1t, (10)
6Figure 1:R e g i o n so fW1t and W2t
and, similarly, in regions C and D the solution is unique and is given by
Y ∗
1t = W1t. (11)
However, in region E the solution is not unique. For example, for W1t =















Using the index dt to designate the choice of the solution when −1 <W it ≤ 0
we have
Y ∗
it(dt)=dtWit +( 1− dt)(1 + Wit), for i =1 ,2, (12)
where the “favourable” solution occurs if dt =1 , and the “unfavourable”
solution occurs if dt =0 . Notice that in the present set up the crisis (un-
favourable outcome) is associated with the upper tail (large positive val-
ues). It is clear from Equation (12) that the distribution of Y ∗
it(dt) is a
mean mixture of distributions with dt as the selection parameter. Hence,
dt ∼ Bernoulli(π), where π is the probability of Wit being chosen in the
mixture.
This is an interesting example where non-uniqueness arises only if the
fundamentals (as measured by Wit) for both countries (markets) are favourable
but weak (in relation to the threshold values). This appears similar to the
7notion of weak fundamentals used by Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996).
This result also raises the possibility of policy intervention for ensuring that
the “favourable” solution is in fact selected. It is also reasonable to ex-
pect that the correlation of Y1t and Y2t would be higher if the unfavourable
solution is chosen as compared to the favourable one. Simulation results
reported below bear this out.
Collecting the various components of the solution given by (10) to (12)
we have
Y1t =( 1 + W1t)I(W2t) (Region A)
+(1+W1t)I( −W2t)I ( 1+W2t)I(W1t) (Region B)
+W1t I(−1 − W2t) (Region C)
+W1t I(−W2t)I ( 1+W2t)I(−1 − W1t) (Region D)
+Y ∗




Y2t =( 1 + W2t)I(W1t)
+(1 + W2t)I(−W1t)I ( 1+W1t)I(W2t)
+W2t I(−1 − W1t) (14)
+W2t I(−W1t)I ( 1+W1t)I(−1 − W2t)
+Y ∗
2t(dt)I(−W1t)I ( 1+W1t)I(−W2t)I(1+W2t).
In terms of the original variables we obtain
y∗
it = βiY ∗
it + cit, for i =1 ,2. (15)
It is important that the above solution is valid even if yi,t−1, yi,t−2,a r e
included amongst of the individual-speciﬁc regressors, xit. This feature con-
siderably enhance the relevance of the model to the analysis of ﬁnancial
markets that show a mild degree of short term over-shooting.
It is clear that y1t and y2t will be correlated even if w1t and w2t are inde-
pendently distributed, i.e. for values of βi > 0, Corr(y1t,y 2t) > 0 even when
Corr(w1t,w 2t)=0 . For example, consider the simple case where β2 =0and
β1 > 0 of Equations (5) and (6) and w1t,w 2t are independently distributed.
In this case
Cov(y1t,y 2t)=β1 [1 − F2(c2t)]{E(w2t − c2t | w2t >c 2t) − E(w2t − c2t)},
and
Corr(y1t,y 2t)=







8where F2(x) is the cumulative distribution function of w2t.I nt h ee x t r e m e
value literature, E(w2t − c2t | w2t >c 2t) is known as the mean excess func-
tion of w2t, see for example Embrechts, Klüppelberg and Mikosch (1997).
This result provide support for the hypothesis that the degree of the de-
pendence of y1t and y2t is an increasing function of the degree of the fat-
tailedness of the w2t process. For wit ∼ N(0,1),
Corr(y1t,y 2t)=




> 0, for β1 > 0, c2t > 0.
4 Some Numerical Results
Suppose that cit =1 .64 (that corresponds to the upper 95% tail of the













Using these parameters we can sample the dependent variables and investi-
gate their properties for diﬀerent values of the contagion coeﬃcient β.T h e
results reported below are based on 30,000 sampled values of y1t and y2t.
Table 1 reports the moments of y1t and the correlation of y1t and y2t
under the assumption that only one of the mixture distributions is visited,
note however that due to the symmetry of the model the reported moments
also apply to y2t. On the left side of the table the results for π =1are
reported and on the right side the results for π =0 .
Table 1: Moments of the distribution of yt
π =1 (dt =1 ) π =0 (dt =0 )
β ¯ y1 σ(y1) Kurt Corr ¯ y1 σ(y1) Kurt Corr
ρ =0
0.5 0.028 1.00 0.08 0.120 0.030 1.01 0.07 0.127
1.0 0.063 1.05 0.43 0.238 0.107 1.11 0.150 . 3 19
2.0 0.1611 .24 1.96 0.457 0.863 1.69 -1.130 . 7 0 6
ρ =0 .5
0.5 0.065 1.48 0.06 0.602 0.0711 .49 0.03 0.606
1.0 0.154 1.61 0.15 0.677 0.212 1.66 -0.150 . 6 9 7
2.0 0.369 1.94 0.19 0.767 0.907 2.18- 1.05 0.816
“Kurt” denotes Kurtosis-3 of the distribution of y1t and “Corr” the correlation
between y1t and y2t.
Rather than choosing only one part of the mixture in (15) one can also
consider intermediate cases where both parts of the mixture are visited.
Below we set π =0 .5 by sampling dt =I ( st) where st is the realisation of
9a random variable characterising the nature of the policy intervention. In a
purely random case where st ∼ N(0,1) one obtains very pronounced bimodal
distributions for y∗
it. A clear polar separation of solutions emerge when β is
l a r g e ,a sc a nb es e e ni nF i g u r e s2 - 3f o rβ =2and ρ =0 .8. More dramatic
pictures can be obtained for larger values of β as in Figure 4 and 5. These
parameter values are chosen for illustrative purposes and we do not expect
to observe such extreme phenomena in practice. For small values of β the
polarisation is very slight and cannot be revealed by visual inspection. This
c a nb es e e ni nF i g u r e s6a n d7 ,w h i c hd i s p l a yt h er e s u l t sf o rβ =0 .5 and
ρ =0 .5.
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Figure 3: Histogram and normal curve for y1 (β =2 , ρ =0 .8, π =0 .5)
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Figure 5: Histogram and normal curve for y1 (β =3 .5, ρ =0 .8, π =0 .5)
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Figure 7: Histogram and normal curve for y1 (β =0 .5, ρ =0 .8, π =0 .5)
135 Herding and Contagion
The literature on herding places important emphasis on the discounting of
private (or individual-speciﬁc) information at times of crisis. Combining a




1x1t [1 − ϕ1I(y2t − c2σ2,t−1)] + β1I(y2t − c2σ2,t−1)+u1t,
y2t = δ0
2zt + α0
2x2t [1 − ϕ2I(y1t − c1σ1,t−1)] + β2I(y1t − c1σ1,t−1)+u2t,
where ϕi c a nb ev i e w e da sah e r d i n gc o e ﬃcient if the individual-speciﬁc
variables x1t and x2t are independently distributed. It would be reasonable
to expect that 1 ≥ ϕi ≥ 0, so that herding has a discounting, non-perverse
eﬀect on private information. In the case where x1t and x2t are correlated,
the “herding factors”, −ϕiI(yjt − cjσj,t−1) i,j =1 ,2, must be applied to
the non-correlated components of x1t and x2t. Under this set up private
information is discounted only in crisis periods. Dynamics can be introduced
in the model by allowing xit to contain lagged values, yi,t−1,y i,t−2,....








I(yjt − cjσj,t−1)+uit,f o ri,j =1 ,2,
and solved/analysed as before by treating βi in the previous set up as a
time varying coeﬃcient, βit = βi − ϕiα0
ixit. In the case where x1t and
x2t are independently distributed it is easy to show that the covariance of
y1t and y2t does not increase as a result of herding, so long as contagion
eﬀects are not operating (βi =0 ). In fact herding (as deﬁned here) reduces
correlations as it raises volatilities without increasing covariances. This is
in contrast to the case of contagion which is generally associated with a rise
in correlations. Therefore, there is some potential in joint consideration of
herding and contagion. But a detailed discussion would be beyond the scope
of the present paper.
6I d e n t i ﬁcation and Estimation of the Contagion
Coeﬃcients
The system of equations (1) and (2) represent a two-equation non-linear
simultaneous equation model which has been studied extensively in the
econometric literature as summarised by Amemiya (1985), for example.
The above equation systems whilst non-linear in the endogenous variables,
yt =( y1t,y 2t)0, are linear in the parameters for known threshold values, c1
and c2. This somewhat simpliﬁes the identiﬁcation and estimation problems.
In what follows we focus on this relatively simple case by assuming that c1
and c2 are known and that the variances σi,t−1 a r et i m ei n v a r i a n ta n dc a n
14be absorbed in ci. The non-uniqueness of the solution is not by itself an
impediment to identiﬁcation and/or consistent estimation of the unknown
parameters. However, eﬃcient estimation of the parameters, for example by
the maximum likelihood method, requires that the solutions (13) and (14)
are augmented with an additional process that speciﬁes the distribution of
dt, the solution indicator. As in the case of simultaneous equation models,
it is possible to consistently estimate the parameters of a single equation in
a system without necessarily having to fully specify the system of equations.
An additional equation for dt, is not essential for the consistent estimation
of the contagion coeﬃcients βi, for example. But the identiﬁcation problem
becomes much more complicated and poses new challenges if the focus of the
analysis is also on the identiﬁcation of the dt process itself. The resolution
of this problem poses new challenges and is beyond the scope of the present
paper. Hence, our focus will be on identiﬁcation and consistent estimation
of the contagion coeﬃcients.
6.1 Inconsistency of the OLS Estimators
Consider the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of yit on zt, xi,t,
I(yjt − cj),f o ri,j =1 ,2 and for simplicity suppose that the two equa-
tions only contain one country-speciﬁc regressor each and assume that these
regressors (x1t,x 2) are strictly exogenous and stationary, distributed inde-
pendently of the errors, u1t and u2t :
y1t = α1x1t + β1I(y2t − c2)+u1t, (16)



















Suppose also that probability of crisis occurring in either of the two countries




I(yjt − cj) → πj, where 1 > πj > 0. (18)
4This is not a primitive assumption and is made here for convenience. The crisis
probabilities, πj, j =1 ,2 depend in a complicated manner on the parameters of the
model and the probability distribution functions of the forcing variables, xjt,a n dt h e
disturbances, ujt,f o rj =1 ,2. These probabilities can be computed numerically using the











xjtuit → 0,f o ri,j =1 ,2. (20)







where d2 =( I ( y21−c2),I(y22−c2),...,I(y2T−c2))0, M1 = IT−x1(x0
1x1)−1x0
1,








I(y2t − c2) −
h
T−1 PT







2M1d2) t e n d st oan o n - z e r oc o n s t a n t ,ω22 > 0.T h i s i s e a s i l y
s e e ni nt h es i m p l ec a s ew h e r ex1t =1for all t. In this case T−1 (d0
2M1d2)
















where u1 =( u11,u 12,...,u 1T)0. Also under our assumptions (see in partic-











































In general, E[u1tI(y2t − c2)] 6=0 , and the OLS estimator of β1 is inconsistent.
The sign and the magnitude of the inconsistency of ˆ β1 depends on β2 and
ρ. The OLS estimator of β1 is consistent only if β2 = ρ =0 ,n a m e l yi ft h e
contagion model is recursive (trinagular) and there are no interdependencies
through the errors. To see this consider the relatively simple case where






u2t + vt, (21)
16where u2t and vt are independently distributed. Note also that vt is distrib-
uted independently of x1t and x2t and has a zero mean. In this case






E[u2tI(α2x2t + u2t − c2)] + E[vtI(α2x2t + u2t − c2)].
Since vt is distributed independently of x2t and u2t, then conditional on x2t
and u2t
E[vtI(α2x2t + u2t − c2)|u2t,x 2t]=I ( α2x2t + u2t − c2)E(vt|u2t,x 2t)=0 ,
and





E[u2tI(α2x2t + u2t − c2)].
The following lemma shows that when ρ > 0, and β2 =0 ,t h e nE[u2tI(y2t −
c2)] > 0,a n dˆ β1 will be a consistent estimator of β1 if and only if ρ =0 .
T h ed i r e c t i o no ft h eb i a si su p w a r dw h e nρ > 0, and downward if ρ < 0.
Lemma 1 Suppose β2 =0 , and conditional on x2t, u2t is normally distrib-
uted, then E[u2tI(y2t − c2)] > 0 if ρ > 0.





u2t if u2t >c 2 − α2x2t,
0 otherwise.
Conditional on x2t, noting that by assumption x2t,a n du2t are independently
distributed we have,
E(u∗
2t |x2t)=P r ( u2t >c 2 − αx2t |x2t)E(u2t|u2t >c 2 − α2x2t ,x 2t).
But





















> 0 for all values of x2t,w ea l s oh a v e :
E(u∗
2t)=E[ u2tI(y2t − c2)] > 0.
17Consider now the general case where ρ > 0 and β2 > 0, and note that
in this case (using (21)) we have





E[u2tI(Y2t) ]+E[ ε1tI(Y2t)], (22)
where Y2t is given by the solution (14), which takes either the value of W2t or
1+W2t. The probability of whether the solution is W2t or 1+W2t depends,
in a complicated manner, on the probability of W1t and W2t falling in the
regions A,B,C, D, and E, and the probability of a particular solution being
selected if W1t and W2t fall in region E. In the Appendix we give results from
Monte Carlo experiments, which show that the expectation is positive for a
wide range of values of β1,β2,α1,α2, and ρ. Therefore, unless β2 = ρ =0 ,
the OLS estimator of β1 will be inconsistent. The large sample bias will be
upward when ρ > 0 and β1 > 0.
6.2 Consistent Estimation of the Contagion Coeﬃcients
Consistent estimation of βi can be achieved by instrumental variable tech-
niques assuming there exists pre-determined variables speciﬁct oc o u n t r yi
that are correlated with I(yit − ci) a n du n c o r r e l a t e dw i t ht h ee r r o r suit.
If there are no country-speciﬁc regressors, namely if α1 = α2 =0 ,t h e
contagion coeﬃcients, βi, are not identiﬁed. In this case
y1t = δ0
1zt + β1I(y2t − c2)+u1t,
y2t = δ0
2zt + β2I(y1t − c1)+u2t,
and the observed common drivers, zt, cannot be used as instruments for
the crisis indicators. In this case pooling of the country equations will not
help either, even if the slope homogeneity assumption is imposed (namely if
δ1 = δ2,a n dβ1 = β2).
If, however, country (market) speciﬁc regressors exist, i.e. αi 6=0 , i =
1,2, the following instrumental variables estimator can be used. Suppose











where Σww is a (non-stochastic) positive deﬁnite matrix.
(ii) Let h1t =( z0
t,x0
1t,I(y2t − c2))0,a n dh2t =( z0
t,x0







where Qi i =1 ,2 are full column rank matrices and the convergence
to Qi is uniform.
18Then the IV estimator of θi =( δ0
i,α0


























is consistent for θi as T →∞ .
The validity of these conditions need to be checked in the case of the
particular model under consideration. For example, suppose the model of
interest is given by (16) and (17), and that the conditions (18) to (20) hold,
and T−1 PT







t=1 x1tI(y2t − c2)
T−1 PT
t=1 x2tx1t T−1 PT
t=1 x2tI(y2t − c2)
!
= V1.
Then α1 and β1 can be identiﬁed if V1 has a full rank. This rank condition
can be investigated using the solutions (13) and (14). Although, the exact
form of V1 depends on the way the indeterminacy of the solution is resolved
in periods where −1 <W it =( αixit + uit − ci)/βi ≤ 0,f o ri =1 ,2,i t
would nevertheless be possible to check if V1 is full rank without a full
speciﬁcation of the dt process. For example, it suﬃces to postulate that
dt follows a general Bernoulli process with a probability that varies with
the state variables, xit, i =1 ,2.I n t h e c a s e w h e r e xit and uit are strictly













→ E[x2tI(y2t − c2)].
These results, in conjunction with the solution (13) and (14) allow us to
establish the rank of V1 without an exact knowledge of the dt process.
7 Correlation Based Tests of Contagion
In a number of papers by Boyer, Gibson, and Loretan (1999), Loretan and
English (2000), Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbra-
cia (2002) attempts have been made to identify contagion eﬀects from pair-
wise correlation of stock market returns by testing whether correlation is
19signiﬁcantly higher during crises times compared to normal periods. The
main diﬀerence between the studies is in how the correlation coeﬃcient is
adjusted for the higher volatility in crises periods. The studies require ap r i -
ori speciﬁcation of the crises periods. The data employed are daily return
observations and do not consider global or country-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e si nt h e i r
analysis.
In terms of our set up the basic model underlying this approach can be
written as (following the approach of Corsetti et al.)
y1t = α1 + β1I(y2t − c2t)+u1t,
y2t = α2 + β2I(y1t − c1t)+u2t,
where ct is gleaned from the data, and the inter-dependence across the two
countries is characterised using the single factor speciﬁcation
uit = γi ft + εit, (23)





ft and εit are also assumed to be independently distributed. For the two-
country set up the single factor model is algebraically equivalent to assuming











Under this set up there exist no valid instruments with which to identify
the contagion coeﬃcient from the inter-dependence coeﬃcient ρ.T h ei d e n -
tiﬁcation problem is overcome in this literature by assuming that the crises
periods are known ap r i o r i , and are suﬃciently prolonged and continuous
so that correlation of y1t and y2t during crisis and non-crisis periods can be
consistently estimated and compared.
Therefore, this approach is problematic on three counts.
1. The endogeneity problem discussed in the previous section is circum-
vented by separating crises periods from non-crises periods. Since crisis
periods are identiﬁed ex post, after passing through the observations,
the endogeneity bias is re-introduced, however, in form of a sample
selection bias.
2. Multi-country, multi-assets (markets) generalisations of the correla-
tion/covariance approach will require existence of much longer peri-
ods of continuous crisis for the estimation and testing strategy to be
meaningful. Such data sets are unlikely to exist since by their very
nature crisis periods are relatively short.
203. The analysis can not be used in forecasting and is of limited scope in
a structural understanding of the crises and the factors behind their
occurrence.
8 Contagion in a Multi-Country Setting
Consider now a sample of N countries observed over the period t =1 ,2,...,T,
some or all of which could be subject to a crisis at least at some times over







wijI(yjt − cjσj,t−1)+uit, i =1 ,2...,N,
where the weights wij ≥ 0 are such that
PN
j=1 wij =1 ,a n dwii =0 ,f o r
all i. The theoretical literature on contagion can often be cast in terms
of this general formulation. For example, Allen and Gale (2000) consider a
theoretical model of ﬁnancial contagion where bank failures spread from one
region to another under diﬀerent market structures. They set N =4and
consider three types of market structures, namely “complete”, “incomplete”,
and “disconnected incomplete”. In terms of our set up these correspond to



































Notice also that the incomplete structures pre-suppose the existence of cer-
tain ordering of the regions, although no particular ordering of the regions
is required under the complete market structure. Under the disconnected
incomplete structure the N =4problem reduces to two separate N =2
problems and their solutions do not pose any new diﬃculties. The incom-
p l e t em a r k e tp a t t e r nc a nb er e d u c e dt ot h ef o l l o w i n gg e n e r a l i s a t i o no f( 7 )
21and (8)
Y1t = W1t +I (Y2t),
Y2t = W2t +I (Y3t),
Y3t = W3t +I (Y4t),








ixit + uit − ciσi,t−1
βi
, i =1 ,2,3,4. (24)
The solution in this case can be obtained along similar lines followed for the
simple case of N =2 , although at the expense of much greater details. As
before there will also be multiple solutions. For example, in the case where
Wit =0 , two solutions are possible, namely Y a
it =0and Y b
it =1 .Ac o m p l e t e
characterisation of the solutions for all possible values of Wit will be beyond
the scope of the present paper.
However, some interesting results can be obtained under the complete
market structure. In this case (for a general N)w eh a v e
yit = α0xit + β
ÃPN
j=1,j6=i I(yjt − cj)
N − 1
!
+ γft + εit, i =1 ,2...,N, (25)
w h e r ef o rs i m p l i c i t yw eh a v eo m i t t e dt h ec o m m o no b s e r v e de ﬀects (zt),
assumed all the coeﬃcients are homogeneous and have charachterised the
inter-dependence of the errors using the single factor structure given by (23).
Deﬁne the crisis indicator κit =I ( yit − ci). Then,
PN











where ¯ κt = N−1 PN
i=1 κit.A v e r a g i n g( 2 5 )o v e rt =1 ,2,...,T,w eh a v e 5
¯ yt = α0¯ xt−1 + β¯ κt + γft +¯ εt.
Using this result in (25) to eliminate the unobserved common eﬀect, ft,, we
have
















5See Pesaran (2002) for a general discussion of the analysis of cross-sectional depen-
dence in large panels.
22Hence
yit − ¯ yt = α0 (xit − ¯ xt) − β
µ
κit − ¯ κt
N − 1
¶
+( εit − ¯ εt).
I nt h ec a s ew h e r eN is suﬃciently large, the second term converges to zero
and β cannot be identiﬁed, although a consistent estimator of α can be
obtained from an OLS regression of yit − ¯ yt on (xit − ¯ xt). Allowing for
parameter heterogeneity does not resolve this problem. For N ﬁxed as T →
∞, the condition for identiﬁcation of β is similar to the two-country case
discussed in Section 6 above.
9 Panel Estimates of Contagion
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996, 1997), Esquivel and Larrain (1998),
Kruger, Osakwe and Page (1998), Kumar, Moorthy and Perraudin (2002)
a n dS t o n ea n dW e e k s( 2 0 0 1) attempt to estimate and test for contagion
eﬀects using panel data. The econometric approach taken in these papers is
based on binary choice models with linear index functions
yit = α0i + α0xit + εit, for i =1 ,2,...,N, t=1 ,2,...,T, (26)
where yit is a latent variable observed qualitatively through a univariate
binary response indicator, κit =I ( yit), the currency crisis indicator. xit is a
k×1 vector of observed macroeconomic and political variables, α is a k×1
vector of unknown coeﬃcients and εit is an idiosyncratic error assumed to
be serially uncorrelated for each i,a n diid normal distributed across i with
mean zero, a unit variance. Except for the paper by Esquivel and Larrain
(1998), who use a random eﬀects probit model, the literature assumes that
α0i = α0.
Contagion is addressed by including a dummy variable, Cit,i nm o d e l( 2 6 ) ,










Under this formulation the crisis indicator, Cit, takes the value of unity if
any one of the N − 1 remaining countries ﬁnd themselves in a crisis state.
This formulation is quite similar to that discussed above and is subject to
similar identiﬁcation and estimation issues. Due to the non-linear nature
of this formulation, in order to assess the impact of the endogeneity on the
parameter estimates in the probit model of (26) we conduct a Monte Carlo
experiment using the data of Eichengreen et al. (1996). Details of the data
are given in the Appendix 12.
239.1 Experimental Design
The Monte Carlo experiments are based on the following data generating
process (DGP):
yr
it = α0 + α0xr
it + ur
it,
where i =1 ,2,...,N , t =1 ,2,...,T,r=1 ,2,...,R, r refers to the repli-
cation number in the Monte Carlo experiments, R is the total number of
replications, α is a k ×1 vector of parameters, xr
it is a k ×1 vector of simu-
lated exogenous variables. Under this DGP, β = 0 and all other coeﬃcients
are assumed to be identical across i.
The estimation of α0 and α under a probit speciﬁcation only makes use
of κr
it =I ( yr
it) and, hence, without loss of generality the variance of the error
term, ur
it, may be set equal to unity. To allow for correlation across the









where γi is a scalar, fr
t ∼ iidN(0,1),a n dεr
it ∼ iidN(0,1). Under these
assumptions we have E(ur
it)=0and Var(ur
it)=1 . The pairwise correlation















Regarding values of yr
it > 0 as crisis, in all our experiments we ﬁx α0 such
that the fraction of observations, π,w i t hyr
it > 0 is non-zero but relatively
small, namely π =5 % . For this purpose, assuming that the regressors are
normally distributed we have α0xit+uit ∼ iidN(0,1+α0Σxα) and therefore
Pr(yr
















¢1/2 Φ−1(1 − π). (28)
This is an important choice in the Monte Carlo experiment because the
contagion dummy becomes a vector of ones if the proportion of crises periods
is too high and then the right hand side variables are perfectly collinear as
they contain an intercept and the contagion dummy. On the other hand,
data sets without crises are meaningless for the concept of contagion and
the estimation of a probit model is not possible.
For each replication a contagion dummy, Cr











24For the probit estimation only the binary indicator κr
it =I ( yr
it) is observed.
The probability of κr
it =1is modelled as
Pr(κr
it =1 )=Φ(α0 + βCr
it + α0xr
it),
a n df o rt h el i n e a rO L Sr e g r e s s i o nt h ea s s u m e dm o d e li s
yr






e). The parameters of the probit model (in particular the
contagion coeﬃcient, β) are computed by the maximum likelihood method.
In a ﬁrst set of Monte Carlo experiments, we generate xr
it ∼ iid(0,Σx)
for two values of k, namely k =1and k =2 .W e ﬁx Σx implicitly by










it ∼ iidN(0,1),a n dhr
t ∼ iidN(0,1). To ensure that the regres-
sors are distributed independently of the errors, hr
t and fr
t are taken to be
independent draws. Finally, without loss of generality we set α = ιk, a
k × 1 vector of ones. Note that under φi =0 , Σx = Ik, and using (28)
we have α0 =1 .96(
√
1+k) for π =0 .025,a n dα0 =1 .64(
√
1+k) for
π =0 .05.I n t h e c a s e w h e r e φi > 0, Σx will have typical oﬀ diagonal




1+φj),a n dα0 follows from (28).
Note that, while we appreciate that parameter heterogeneity may be
important in applications, we abstract from it in the Monte Carlo experiment
for simplicity. Intercept heterogeneity could be introduced via a random
eﬀects probit model or a conditional logit model, see Hsiao (2003).
In a second set of Monte Carlo experiments the exogenous regressors of
Eichengreen et al. (1996, ERW) are used and taken as given across all the
replications. Under the null of no contagion β is set equal to zero and the
other parameters, (α0,α), are set equal to the estimates of the pooled probit
model computed using the ERW data. These estimates are given in Table
2.
25Table 2: Probit model with ERW data
variable (ˆ α0, ˆ α) |t|-value
Intercept (ˆ α0) -1.886 10.751
Capital controls -0.134 0.717
Government victory -0.060 1.141
Government loss -0.332 0.787
Credit growth 0.016 1.880
Inﬂation 0.065 3.584
Output growth 0.020 0.732
Employment growth 0.043 1.007
Unemployment rate 0.073 3.010
Budget position 0.042 2.042
Current account -0.024 1.072
T o t a ln u m b e ro fo b s e r v a t i o n s=6 4 5
Hence, a vector yr is generated as
yr
it =ˆ α0 + ˆ α0xit + ur
it
The speciﬁcation of the error term and the estimation are as in the case of
artiﬁcial data.
9.2 Results of the Monte Carlo Experiments
9.2.1 Results for the Simulated Regressors
Tables 3—8 give the results for the Monte Carlo experiments with artiﬁcially
generated regressors. Tables 3 and 4 report the results for k =1 ,T a b l e s5
and 6 for k =2with orthogonal regressors, and Tables 7 and 8, report the
results for k =2where the regressors are correlated with φi =0 .5, ∀i.T h e
ﬁrst of each pair of tables uses only a discretised dependent variable and
estimates a probit model, while the second uses the continuous dependent
variable and estimates the model by OLS.
It can be seen that throughout all experiments the bias increases with
the size of the correlation of the error term across i. For small and even
medium sample sizes the estimate of β is quite imprecise in the probit model
even under γ =0 . However, the OLS estimates of the contagion eﬀects (β)
under error inter-dependence (ρ = γ2/(1 + γ2) 6=0 ) is positive in all the
experiments, conﬁrming the upward bias derived theoretically in the context
of our simple two-country canonical model.
The last panel of each table gives the rejection probability for the hy-
pothesis of no contagion, i.e. β =0 . It can be seen that the rejection
probability rises as inter-dependence increases. With γ =1 ,t h a ti sw i t h
error correlation 0.5, N =1 0 0and T =1 0 0the hypothesis of no contagion
is always rejected in all models. However, even mild inter-dependence leads
26to high rejection rates. In the OLS estimation with k =1 , γ =0 .4,w h i c h
implies correlation of 0.14, and N = T =5 0the hypothesis of no contagion
is rejected in 97.3% of cases. It can also be seen that the probit model has
poor size, over-rejecting the null in all cases.
A further interesting result is that even for homogeneous γ the precision
of the estimates does not improve equally with increasing N and T.I ti sc l e a r
that for all the experiments the root mean square errors are systematically
lower with T larger than N for a given value of the product N × T.F o r
example in Table 3, for γ =1 , the RMSE is 1.192 for T =5 0 , N =1 0 0 ,
and 1.055 for T =1 0 0 , N =5 0 . The intuition behind this is the way the
contagion variable is constructed, which means that the information contents
of increasing N and T are not the same. Recall that the contagion variable
is 1 for all i if there are at least two crises in the period, and hence the eﬀect
of increasing N will be limited.
9.2.2 Results Based on the ERW Regressors
The pooled OLS and pooled probit results for this case are summarised in
Table 9. Both sets of results clearly show an upward bias in the estimates
of the contagion coeﬃcient for non-zero values of γ, with the bias increasing
steadily with γ. The bias could be substantial even for moderate degrees of
cross dependence. For example, for γ =0 .4 (which corresponds to a pairwise
cross correlation coeﬃcient of around 0.14) the pooled panel estimate of β
is 0.27 as compared to its true value of zero. This result holds both under
homogeneous and heterogeneous γ0s, and estimation procedures.
The null hypothesis of β =0is also rejected well in excess of the nominal
5% level for all non-zero values of γ. The pooled probit estimates also
exhibit a substantial degree of over-rejection (12.3% as compared to 5%)
even under γ =0 . The degree of over-rejection of the pooled OLS estimates
(7.2%) is much less pronounced, although still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
5% considering that the experiments are based on 2000 replications.
In view of these results it is reasonable to conclude that the estimate
of the contagion coeﬃcient of 0.54 that one obtains from pooled probit
estimation using the ERW data could be wholly or partly due to neglected
inter-dependencies of the equation errors across diﬀerent countries.
10 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a canonical model of contagion. Using
this model, we have considered the issue of identiﬁcation and consistent
estimation of contagion coeﬃcients. We show that in the presence of er-
ror inter-dependencies contagion eﬀects cannot be consistently estimated
without country-speciﬁc fundamentals. This clearly highlights some of the
pitfalls that surround the empirical studies of currency crises and ﬁnancial
27contagions that are extant in the literature. Correlation analysis that looks
for signiﬁcant shifts in correlation coeﬃcients across the crisis and tranquil
periods are usually based on high frequency data (daily or weekly) for which
there are no observations on country speciﬁc fundamentals. In the case of
such data sets identiﬁcation of contagion is achieved by making strong a
priori assumptions concerning sample splits into “crisis” and “no-crisis” pe-
riods. Invariably, this also involves the identiﬁcation of the source country
in which the crisis is purported to have begun.
Multi-country panel analyses of the type carried out by ERW do con-
tain country speciﬁc fundamentals and could in principle be used to shed
light on the issue of contagion versus inter-dependence. However, panel
data studies are typically carried out assuming that contagion indices are
exogenous and that errors across countries/markets are independently dis-
tributed, and as we have shown this could introduce a substantial upward
bias in the estimates of the contagion coeﬃcients. A simultaneous estima-
tion of inter-dependence and contagion eﬀects are required. The canonical
model presented in this paper could be viewed as a ﬁrst step towards such
an objective.
11 Appendix: Simulation of E[u2tI(y1t − c1)]
Table A reports the simulated values of E[u2tI(y1t − c1)] using
PT
t=1 [u2tI(y1t − c1)]/T
with T =2 ,000,000. The data are generated from the reduced form of the
model given by Equations (13) and (14) with k =1 , xit,u it ∼ iidN(0,1),
Pr(dt =1 )=0 .50,a n dci =1 .64. It can be seen that only for ρ = β =0the
simulated value is zero. Similar results are also obtained for other choices
of the solution indicator, dt,n a m e l ydt =0 ,o rdt =1 .
28Table A: Simulated Values of
PT
t=1 [u2tI(y1t − c1)]/T
ρβ α
−4 −1 0 1 4
−0.99 −4 −0.095 −0.143 −0.103 −0.142 −0.096
−1 −0.092 −0.143 −0.103 −0.142 −0.092
0 −0.089 −0.142 −0.103 −0.143 −0.088
1 −0.082 −0.140 −0.103 −0.140 −0.083
4 −0.054 −0.037 −0.024 −0.039 −0.053
−0.50 −4 −0.056 −0.077 −0.052 −0.077 −0.056
−1 −0.050 −0.075 −0.052 −0.075 −0.050
0 −0.045 −0.072 −0.052 −0.072 −0.044
1 −0.036 −0.051 −0.040 −0.051 −0.037
4 −0.011 0.030 0.023 0.031 −0.011
0.00 −4 −0.018 −0.017 −0.005 −0.017 −0.017
−1 −0.007 −0.010 −0.004 −0.010 −0.008
0 0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000
1 0.008 0.040 0.045 0.041 0.008
4 0.032 0.089 0.060 0.090 0.032
0.50 −4 0.022 0.035 0.026 0.035 0.021
−1 0.036 0.053 0.036 0.052 0.036
0 0.045 0.072 0.052 0.072 0.045
1 0.055 0.128 0.135 0.128 0.055
40 . 0 7 50 . 134 0.082 0.134 0.074
0.99 −4 0.060 0.078 0.010 0.078 0.060
−1 0.078 0.112 0.047 0.1120 . 0 7 9
00 . 0 8 90 . 142 0.103 0.142 0.089
1 0.099 0.208 0.213 0.207 0.099
40 . 1140 . 165 0.070 0.166 0.115
The results are from data generated according to Equations (13)
and (14),with k =1 , xit,u it ∼ iidN(0,1), Pr(dt=1 )=0 .5, ci=1 .64,
and T =2 ,000,000.
12 Data Appendix
The data set used by Eichengreen et al. (1996, 1997) is available on the
internet at
http://haas.berkeley.edu/∼arose/RecRes.htm
along with a Stata log ﬁle. The description of the data is identical in Eichen-
green et al. (1996, pp. 477—478) and (1997, pp. 23—25).
According to Eichengreen et al. (1997, p. 23) “[t]he data set is quarterly,
spanning 1959 through 1993 for twenty industrial countries.” The countries
are the USA, UK, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands,
29Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, Australia and Germany as the centre country. “Most of
the variables are transformed into diﬀerential percentage changes by taking
diﬀerences between domestic and German annualised fourth-diﬀerences of
natural logarithms and multiplying by a hundred.” (Eichengreen et al. 1997,
p. 23).
The variables are: Total non-gold international reserves (IMF IFS line
1ld), exchange rate with US dollar (rf), money market rates (60b) or where
unavailable discount rates (60), exports and imports (70 and 71), the current
account (80) and the central governments budget position (80) both as per-
centages of nominal GDP (99a), long term bond yields (61), nominal stock
market index (62), domestic credit (32), M1 (34), M2 (35 + M1), CPI (64),
real GDP (99a.r), and relative unit labour cost (reu). Further from the
OECD’s Main Economic Indicators employment and unemployment, and
Eichengreen et al. construct “indicators of government electoral victories
and defeats, using Keesing’s Record of World Events a n dt h eW o r l dB a n k s ’
Political Handbook of the World.” (Eichengreen et al. 1997, p. 24)
Eichengreen et al. use the following deﬁnition of the exchange-rate mar-
ket pressure index
EMPit = λ1%∆eit + λ2%∆(rit − rGt) − λ3(%∆fit − %∆fGt), (29)
where eit is the exchange rate to the US Dollar, rit the interest rate, and
fit the international reserves of country i. Subscript G indicates variables
for Germany, which is taken as the center country. Eichengreen et al.
(1997, pp.23—24) say that they “weight the components so as to equalize
the volatility of the three components”. This is accomplished by setting
λi =1 /σi, where σi is the standard deviation of component i. For this data
set σ1 =0 .243, σ2 =0 .037,a n dσ3 =0 .0047.
T h ec r i s i si n d e xi st h ec a l c u l a t e da s
yit =
½
1 EMPit >µ EMP +1 .5σEMP
0o t h e r w i s e
where µEMP is the mean and σEMP is the standard deviation of the exchange
rate market pressure index.
The credit growth, the inﬂation rate, the output growth and the current
account are calculated as
dxit =1 0 0∗ ln(xit/xit−4) − ln(xGt/xGt−4), (30)
where xit is the variable for country i and Germany, G. The relative unem-
ployment rate is dxit = xit − xGt. The relative budget position is deﬁned
as dbit = bit/yit − bGt/yGt, where bit is the nominal government budget of
country i, yit is the GDP of country i and Germany, G. The dummies for
30capital controls, government electoral victory and government electoral loss
are not transformed. The other variables mentioned above are not used.
“To avoid counting the same crisis more than once, we exclude the
later observation(s) when two (or more) crises occur in successive quar-
ters.” (Eichengreen et al. 1997, p.22) Country by country excluding time
periods with missing data results in 645 observations for 17c o u n t r i e sw i t h
56 crises observations. The countries are the USA, the UK, Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada,
Japan, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Australia.
References
Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (2000), ‘Financial Contagion’, Journal of
Political Economy, 108(1), 1—33.
Amemiya, Takeshi (1985) Advanced Econometrics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell)
Bae, Kee-Hong, G. Andrew Karolyi, and René M. Stulz (2003) ‘A new
approach to measuring ﬁnancial contagion.’ Review of Financial Studies
16(3), 717—763
Boyer, Brian H., Michael S. Gibson, and Mico Loretan (1999) ‘Pitfalls in
tests for changes in correlation.’ Federal Reserve Board International Fi-
nance Discussion Paper 597
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Marcello Pericoli, and Massimo Sbracia (2002) ‘‘Some
contagion, some interdependence’: More pitfalls in tests of ﬁnancial con-
tagion.’ mimeo,U n i v e r s i t yo fR o m eI I I
Dungey, Mardi, Renée Fry, Brenda González-Hermosillo and Vance L. Mar-
tin (2003), ‘Empirical modelling of contagion: A review of methodolo-
gies.’, mimeo, CERF, Cambridge University
Dornbusch, Rudiger, Yung Chul Park, and Stijn Claessens (2000), ‘Con-
tagion: Understanding how it spreads’, World Bank Research Observer,
15(2), 177—97
Eichengreen, Barry, Andrew K. Rose, and Charles Wyplosz (1996) ‘Con-
tagious currency crises: First tests.’ Scandinavian Journal of Economics
98(4), 463—484
(1997) ‘Contagious currency crises.’ mimeo,U CB e r k e l e y
Embrechts, P., C. Klüppelberg, and T. Mikosch (1997) Modelling Extremal
Events for Insurance & Finance (Berlin: Springer Verlag)
Esquivel, Gerardo, and Felipe Larraín B. (1998) ‘Explaining currency crises.’
mimeo,H a r v a r dU n i v e r s i t y
Favero, Carlo, A. and Francesco Giavazzi, (2002), ‘Is the international prop-
agation of ﬁnancial shocks non-linear? Evidence from the ERM.’, Journal
of International Economics, 57, 231—46
Forbes, Kristin, and Roberto Rigobon (2001) ‘Measuring contagion: Con-
31ceptual and empirical issues.’ In International Financial Crises, ed. Stijn
Claessens and Kristin J. Forbes (Boston: Kluwer) pp. 43—66
(2002) ‘No contagion, only interdependence: Measuring stock market
co-movements.’ Journal of Finance 57(5), 2223—2261
Hsiao, Cheng (2003), Analysis of Panel Data, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press)
King, Mervyn A. and Sushil Wadhwani (1990), ‘Transmission of volatility
between stock markets’ Review of Financial Studies,3 ( 1), 5—33
Kruger, Mark, Patrick N. Osakwe, and Jennifer Page (1998) ‘Fundamentals,
contagion and currency crises: An empirical analysis’ Bank of Canada
Working Paper 98-10
Kumar, Mohan, Uma Moorthy, and William Perraudin (2002) ‘Predicting
emerging market currency crashes.’ IMF Working Paper 02/7
Loretan, Mico, and William B. English (2000) ‘Evaluating “correlation
breakdowns” during periods of market volatility.’ In International Finan-
cial Markets and the Implication for Monetary and Financial Stability,
e d .B a n kf o rI n t e r n a t i o n a lS e t t l e m e n t s( B a s l e : B a n kf o rI n t e r n a t i o n a l
Settlements)
M a s s o n ,P a u lR .( 1999) ‘Contagion: Monsoonal eﬀects, spillovers, and jumps
between multiple equilibria.’ In The Asian Crises: Causes, Contagion
and Consequences, ed. P. Agénor, M. Miller, and D. Vines (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press)
Pericoli, Marcello, and Massimo Sbracia (2002) ‘A primer on ﬁnancial con-
tagion.’ Journal of Economic Surveys, 17(4), 571—608
Pesaran, M. Hashem (2002) ‘Estimation and inference in large heterogeneous
panels with cross section dependence’ mimeo, University of Cambridge
Sachs, Jeﬀrey, Aaron Tornell and Andrés Velasco (1996) ‘Financial Crises
in Emerging Markets: The Lessons from 1995’ Brookings Papers on Eco-
nomic Activity 1, 147—215
Stone, Mark R., and Melvyn Weeks (2001)‘ S y s t e m i cﬁnancial crises, balance
sheets, and model uncertainty.’ IMF Working Paper 01/162
32￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
!
"
￿
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
&
’
￿
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
*
 
,
+
-
.
/
*
$
+
0
$
#
*
$
+
$
#
 
$
+
 
 
1
*
 
,
+
$
-
￿
*
$
+
$
1
 
*
$
+
$
 
/
*
$
+
$
.
%
*
$
+
￿
￿
%
*
$
+
$
#
.
*
$
+
$
$
.
*
$
+
$
 
/
$
+
#
*
 
,
+
-
 
 
*
$
+
.
.
%
$
+
$
.
0
$
+
#
$
0
*
$
+
1
/
/
$
+
$
 
/
$
+
$
-
%
$
+
 
#
#
*
$
+
 
/
0
$
+
$
%
￿
$
+
$
-
.
$
+
 
￿
$
$
+
.
*
 
,
+
.
.
-
*
$
+
 
/
-
$
+
￿
￿
1
$
+
.
￿
%
*
$
+
.
 
-
$
+
#
#
.
$
+
￿
￿
1
$
+
.
#
￿
$
+
$
0
%
$
+
#
0
.
$
+
￿
￿
#
$
+
.
￿
￿
$
+
0
*
$
+
1
/
/
$
+
 
￿
.
$
+
%
/
0
$
+
/
 
 
*
$
+
 
￿
$
$
+
.
/
1
$
+
%
-
0
$
+
/
$
￿
$
+
￿
.
$
$
+
%
$
$
$
+
%
-
/
$
+
/
 
%
$
+
1
*
$
+
0
0
 
$
+
.
.
%
$
+
1
.
 
$
+
-
-
%
$
+
#
%
1
$
+
/
 
%
$
+
1
.
$
$
+
-
%
$
$
+
%
-
￿
$
+
/
#
%
$
+
1
￿
/
$
+
-
%
$
 
*
$
+
 
-
1
$
+
/
/
.
 
,
+
$
%
.
 
,
+
 
-
0
$
+
%
 
.
$
+
-
 
.
 
,
+
$
￿
-
 
,
+
 
0
$
$
+
1
 
-
$
+
-
#
.
 
,
+
$
￿
0
 
,
+
 
%
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
9
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
*
 
,
+
1
$
1
*
$
+
.
 
 
$
+
$
0
/
$
+
#
 
0
*
$
+
1
￿
$
$
+
$
￿
$
$
+
$
-
 
$
+
 
 
1
*
$
+
 
/
 
$
+
$
%
%
$
+
$
-
#
$
+
 
#
0
$
+
.
*
 
,
+
.
%
.
*
$
+
 
%
1
$
+
#
1
-
$
+
.
$
/
*
$
+
.
/
-
$
+
#
 
￿
$
+
￿
#
#
$
+
￿
-
/
$
+
$
 
/
$
+
#
.
/
$
+
￿
#
￿
$
+
.
$
$
$
+
0
*
$
+
1
/
.
$
+
 
%
0
$
+
%
%
.
$
+
0
%
1
*
$
+
 
%
%
$
+
.
/
$
$
+
%
%
#
$
+
0
.
1
$
+
￿
￿
.
$
+
.
0
￿
$
+
%
%
1
$
+
0
%
%
$
+
1
*
$
+
0
0
￿
$
+
￿
%
#
$
+
/
0
0
$
+
1
1
.
$
+
#
$
%
$
+
0
1
 
$
+
/
/
 
$
+
1
/
 
$
+
%
%
1
$
+
0
/
1
$
+
/
0
-
$
+
1
0
￿
 
*
$
+
￿
$
1
$
+
%
1
.
$
+
-
/
1
 
,
+
$
1
/
$
+
.
￿
#
$
+
1
%
1
$
+
-
%
#
 
,
+
$
%
%
$
+
/
1
/
$
+
1
0
 
$
+
-
%
0
 
,
+
$
.
-
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
#
+
-
1
-
 
,
+
0
-
#
$
+
.
#
/
$
+
0
$
￿
#
+
 
1
%
$
+
%
1
 
$
+
#
%
$
$
+
￿
.
0
 
,
+
 
1
.
$
+
#
￿
%
$
+
 
0
-
$
+
#
.
$
$
+
#
#
+
-
/
-
 
,
+
%
-
1
$
+
.
￿
￿
$
+
%
1
.
#
+
$
￿
 
$
+
.
/
￿
$
+
#
0
$
$
+
￿
￿
/
 
,
+
$
#
%
$
+
#
.
￿
$
+
 
-
.
$
+
#
%
 
$
+
.
#
+
/
1
0
 
,
+
%
#
/
$
+
%
0
0
$
+
/
 
 
 
,
+
/
$
-
$
+
%
 
.
$
+
.
 
1
$
+
%
$
#
$
+
1
%
/
$
+
￿
%
.
$
+
￿
/
.
$
+
.
/
 
$
+
0
#
+
0
%
.
 
,
+
.
-
%
$
+
/
/
￿
$
+
-
$
1
 
,
+
0
 
0
$
+
0
￿
%
$
+
0
%
#
$
+
/
.
1
$
+
1
 
1
$
+
%
0
1
$
+
0
#
.
$
+
/
￿
0
$
+
1
#
+
0
$
0
 
,
+
%
0
0
 
,
+
$
#
-
 
,
+
 
.
/
 
,
+
.
0
$
$
+
1
￿
$
$
+
1
1
0
$
+
-
1
%
$
+
1
1
1
$
+
/
/
$
$
+
1
0
$
$
+
-
0
0
 
#
+
0
/
$
 
,
+
/
0
/
 
,
+
#
 
 
 
,
+
￿
%
$
 
,
+
%
 
0
 
,
+
$
￿
#
 
,
+
$
1
#
 
,
+
 
-
#
$
+
-
1
$
$
+
-
0
%
 
,
+
$
%
%
 
,
+
 
0
0
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
9
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
#
+
-
.
$
 
,
+
%
%
/
$
+
.
 
-
$
+
%
1
￿
 
,
+
-
1
0
$
+
.
%
.
$
+
#
%
%
$
+
￿
.
#
$
+
-
-
1
$
+
#
￿
-
$
+
 
-
 
$
+
#
.
/
$
+
.
#
+
/
/
0
 
,
+
.
.
#
$
+
%
￿
1
$
+
0
.
%
 
,
+
/
%
￿
$
+
%
 
￿
$
+
.
$
0
$
+
.
1
#
$
+
-
0
0
$
+
￿
%
 
$
+
￿
0
1
$
+
.
.
$
$
+
0
#
+
0
￿
.
 
,
+
%
$
1
$
+
/
 
%
$
+
1
%
 
 
,
+
0
 
#
$
+
0
￿
#
$
+
0
 
%
$
+
0
-
1
$
+
/
/
/
$
+
%
#
0
$
+
%
-
$
$
+
0
1
$
$
+
1
#
+
0
%
-
 
,
+
/
0
/
$
+
-
-
/
 
,
+
$
￿
.
 
,
+
.
-
/
$
+
1
 
#
$
+
1
#
 
$
+
-
 
$
$
+
1
.
#
$
+
/
#
0
$
+
/
-
.
$
+
1
1
#
 
#
+
0
-
#
 
,
+
/
$
$
 
,
+
 
#
1
 
,
+
#
0
.
 
,
+
.
/
￿
$
+
-
%
-
$
+
-
-
1
 
,
+
$
-
 
$
+
-
%
.
$
+
-
$
 
$
+
-
/
/
 
,
+
$
0
/
<
=
=
>
?
?
@
A
?
@
=
@
?
B
C
D
E
=
F
D
H
G
I￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
K
J
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
L
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
!
"
￿
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
&
’
￿
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
￿
￿
M
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
N
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
O
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
$
+
$
1
$
$
+
$
-
%
$
+
 
#
-
$
+
 
￿
 
$
+
 
$
￿
$
+
 
$
1
$
+
 
#
1
$
+
 
.
.
$
+
 
$
.
$
+
 
 
$
$
+
 
￿
0
$
+
 
/
$
$
+
#
$
+
$
-
-
$
+
 
￿
#
$
+
 
0
.
$
+
#
￿
 
$
+
 
￿
￿
$
+
 
0
/
$
+
#
.
0
$
+
￿
$
$
$
+
 
%
$
$
+
 
-
0
$
+
￿
$
.
$
+
￿
1
/
$
+
.
$
+
 
%
0
$
+
#
￿
-
$
+
￿
-
/
$
+
.
0
/
$
+
#
#
￿
$
+
￿
%
￿
$
+
0
#
.
$
+
/
.
#
$
+
#
-
-
$
+
%
 
%
$
+
1
#
 
$
+
-
$
1
$
+
0
$
+
#
￿
.
$
+
￿
-
$
$
+
0
#
￿
$
+
/
.
￿
$
+
￿
0
￿
$
+
0
#
 
$
+
-
$
0
$
+
-
0
#
$
+
%
.
%
$
+
1
￿
%
$
+
-
-
 
$
+
-
-
-
$
+
1
$
+
￿
$
$
$
+
%
￿
#
$
+
/
-
$
$
+
-
$
$
$
+
%
#
.
$
+
1
$
0
$
+
-
1
$
$
+
-
-
1
$
+
/
￿
$
$
+
-
0
#
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
$
+
￿
-
/
$
+
0
￿
 
$
+
1
/
0
$
+
-
.
0
$
+
0
.
$
$
+
-
$
.
$
+
-
-
0
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
1
.
1
$
+
-
1
1
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
$
+
 
 
 
$
+
 
￿
￿
$
+
 
/
1
$
+
#
.
0
$
+
 
#
%
$
+
 
0
-
$
+
#
￿
/
$
+
￿
$
.
$
+
 
￿
/
$
+
 
-
#
$
+
￿
$
$
$
+
￿
/
-
$
+
.
$
+
 
%
#
$
+
#
.
￿
$
+
￿
0
#
$
+
.
%
%
$
+
#
 
 
$
+
￿
%
/
$
+
0
 
%
$
+
/
 
#
$
+
#
-
￿
$
+
.
/
%
$
+
1
$
#
$
+
1
1
#
$
+
0
$
+
#
%
/
$
+
￿
0
#
$
+
0
$
￿
$
+
/
#
 
$
+
￿
%
0
$
+
0
 
0
$
+
1
/
#
$
+
-
.
￿
$
+
%
 
1
$
+
/
-
%
$
+
-
1
%
$
+
-
-
0
$
+
1
$
+
#
1
%
$
+
.
-
$
$
+
/
%
#
$
+
1
0
.
$
+
%
 
$
$
+
/
-
$
$
+
-
/
#
$
+
-
-
.
$
+
/
$
$
$
+
-
.
#
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
$
+
￿
0
-
$
+
%
1
-
$
+
1
%
1
$
+
-
#
 
$
+
0
 
￿
$
+
1
0
-
$
+
-
-
￿
$
+
-
-
-
$
+
1
#
 
$
+
-
1
%
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
P
C
@
C
C
Q
=
R
=
A
=
Q
C
@
=
S
>
Q
?
T
U
V
X
W
Y
Z
[
\
]
^
_
a
‘
V
W
Y
]
b
V
W
Y
c
d
e
=
Q
=
‘
V
W
Y
Z
f
g
f
h
i
j
k
K
l
V
X
W
Y
]
m
W
n
V
Y
o
c
n
V
Y
p
l
V
X
W
Y
q
r
r
s
t
k
u
p
v
o
c
^
w
x
C
y
=
z
@
?
Q
?
>
?
A
=
x
c
C
A
S
[
\
Z
{
v
}
|
~
￿
g
v
]
^
_
￿
^
G
b
W
Y
Z
f
g
f
h
￿
￿
j
k
K
￿
W
￿
V
Y
]
￿
V
W
Y
o
c
d
e
=
Q
=
￿
W
q
￿
￿
f
￿
￿
p
￿
￿
￿
￿
c
￿
V
Y
p
￿
V
W
Y
q
r
r
s
t
k
u
p
v
o
c
d
e
=
Q
=
￿
k
K
￿
p
￿
o
S
=
A
?
@
=
x
@
e
=
￿
A
w
>
?
Q
T
S
w
x
@
Q
w
D
￿
@
w
?
A
d
w
@
e
E
?
d
=
Q
E
w
T
w
@
￿
C
A
S
￿
￿
￿
=
Q
E
w
T
w
@
￿
G
B
e
=
￿
Q
?
D
w
@
=
x
@
w
T
C
@
w
?
A
x
￿
x
=
C
S
w
x
z
Q
=
@
w
x
=
S
S
=
￿
=
A
S
=
A
@
y
C
Q
w
C
D
E
=
c
￿
V
W
Y
Z
￿
k
U
V
W
Y
o
G
￿
?
Q
@
e
=
=
x
@
w
T
C
@
w
?
A
x
c
C
x
￿
￿
Q
w
?
￿
x
z
?
A
@
C
R
w
?
A
S
￿
T
T
￿
d
C
x
C
S
S
=
S
C
A
S
@
e
=
z
?
T
T
?
A
>
C
z
@
?
Q
d
C
x
w
R
A
?
Q
=
S
G
B
e
=
Q
=
x
￿
E
@
x
w
A
@
e
=
@
C
D
E
=
C
Q
=
>
?
Q
@
e
=
z
?
A
@
C
R
w
?
A
z
?
=
￿
z
w
=
A
@
c
￿
￿
G
￿
C
Q
@
C
?
>
@
e
=
@
C
D
E
=
Q
=
￿
?
Q
@
x
@
e
=
D
w
C
x
?
>
@
e
=
z
?
=
￿
z
w
=
A
@
?
>
@
e
=
z
?
A
@
C
R
w
?
A
z
?
=
￿
z
w
=
A
@
c
w
G
=
G
￿
￿
V
￿
f
k
￿
￿
￿
V
￿
{
￿
\
o
￿
￿
c
C
A
S
@
e
=
Q
?
?
@
T
=
C
A
x
￿
￿
C
Q
=
=
Q
Q
?
Q
c
k
￿
￿
V
￿
f
k
￿
￿
￿
V
￿
{
￿
\
o
￿
￿
￿
o
f
￿
￿
c
d
e
=
Q
=
@
e
=
@
Q
￿
=
y
C
E
￿
=
￿
\
Z
u
w
A
@
e
=
P
￿
￿
C
A
S
¡
Z
v
p
¢
p
|
|
|
p
￿
d
w
@
e
￿
Z
¢
u
u
u
w
x
@
e
=
A
￿
T
D
=
Q
?
>
Q
=
￿
E
w
z
C
@
w
?
A
x
G
￿
C
Q
@
D
Q
=
￿
?
Q
@
x
@
e
=
?
A
=
£
x
w
S
=
S
Q
=
⁄
=
z
@
w
?
A
￿
Q
?
D
C
D
w
E
w
@
￿
c
d
e
w
z
e
w
x
S
=
¥
A
=
S
C
x
@
e
=
￿
Q
?
D
C
D
w
E
w
@
￿
@
e
C
@
@
e
=
ƒ
£
y
C
E
￿
=
w
x
E
C
Q
R
=
Q
@
e
C
A
@
e
=
~
§
¤
z
Q
w
@
w
z
C
E
y
C
E
￿
=
k
v
G
￿
'
§
o
c
d
e
=
Q
=
@
e
=
Q
=
⁄
=
z
@
w
?
A
￿
Q
?
D
C
D
w
E
w
@
￿
￿
A
S
=
Q
￿
Z
u
w
x
@
e
=
x
w
“
=
C
A
S
￿
A
S
=
Q
￿
«
Z
u
@
e
=
￿
?
d
=
Q
G
I
‹
I￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
›
ﬁ
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
!
"
￿
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
&
’
￿
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
*
$
+
$
$
0
*
$
+
$
$
%
*
$
+
$
$
%
*
$
+
$
$
 
*
$
+
$
$
￿
*
$
+
$
$
 
*
$
+
$
$
￿
*
$
+
$
 
#
*
$
+
$
$
 
$
+
$
$
 
$
+
$
$
 
*
$
+
$
$
%
$
+
#
$
+
$
0
%
$
+
$
/
0
$
+
$
-
#
$
+
 
.
0
$
+
$
0
1
$
+
$
/
0
$
+
 
$
#
$
+
 
￿
-
$
+
$
/
￿
$
+
$
/
-
$
+
 
$
#
$
+
 
.
￿
$
+
.
$
+
#
.
0
$
+
#
/
￿
$
+
￿
#
#
$
+
.
$
#
$
+
#
.
1
$
+
#
0
1
$
+
￿
#
#
$
+
￿
-
%
$
+
#
%
#
$
+
#
0
/
$
+
￿
#
0
$
+
.
$
￿
$
+
0
$
+
.
/
$
$
+
.
/
-
$
+
%
.
￿
$
+
0
￿
$
$
+
.
0
%
$
+
.
1
%
$
+
%
.
0
$
+
0
#
0
$
+
.
0
.
$
+
.
-
 
$
+
%
.
/
$
+
0
#
%
$
+
1
$
+
0
0
/
$
+
0
1
#
$
+
/
￿
#
$
+
1
$
%
$
+
0
0
/
$
+
0
1
%
$
+
/
￿
%
$
+
1
$
.
$
+
0
0
%
$
+
0
1
.
$
+
/
￿
%
$
+
1
$
#
 
$
+
1
.
-
$
+
1
%
￿
$
+
1
1
.
$
+
-
￿
-
$
+
1
￿
￿
$
+
1
%
￿
$
+
1
1
%
$
+
-
￿
/
$
+
1
￿
1
$
+
1
%
 
$
+
1
1
%
$
+
-
￿
0
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
9
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
$
+
$
0
0
$
+
$
/
%
$
+
$
-
0
$
+
 
￿
%
$
+
$
0
/
$
+
$
/
-
$
+
 
$
#
$
+
 
￿
 
$
+
$
0
1
$
+
$
/
/
$
+
 
$
 
$
+
 
.
$
$
+
.
$
+
#
￿
1
$
+
#
0
￿
$
+
#
-
-
$
+
￿
/
1
$
+
#
￿
0
$
+
#
%
/
$
+
￿
 
$
$
+
￿
1
%
$
+
#
.
 
$
+
#
%
1
$
+
￿
 
 
$
+
￿
1
%
$
+
0
$
+
.
%
$
$
+
.
%
-
$
+
%
#
 
$
+
%
/
1
$
+
.
￿
0
$
+
.
0
1
$
+
%
 
.
$
+
%
-
#
$
+
.
.
%
$
+
.
%
-
$
+
%
 
-
$
+
%
-
 
$
+
1
$
+
0
￿
#
$
+
0
.
#
$
+
0
1
%
$
+
/
%
#
$
+
0
#
0
$
+
0
.
￿
$
+
0
1
1
$
+
/
%
%
$
+
0
￿
.
$
+
0
.
0
$
+
0
1
1
$
+
/
%
#
 
$
+
/
-
￿
$
+
/
1
￿
$
+
1
 
-
$
+
1
1
 
$
+
/
/
￿
$
+
/
1
-
$
+
1
￿
#
$
+
1
1
$
$
+
/
1
#
$
+
/
-
￿
$
+
1
￿
$
$
+
1
1
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
$
+
 
-
.
$
+
 
 
.
$
+
$
1
￿
$
+
$
1
/
$
+
 
#
$
$
+
$
/
$
$
+
$
.
-
$
+
$
/
 
$
+
$
1
￿
$
+
$
.
-
$
+
$
￿
.
$
+
$
.
.
$
+
#
$
+
#
#
￿
$
+
 
0
 
$
+
 
%
$
$
+
#
 
 
$
+
 
%
$
$
+
 
 
0
$
+
 
#
%
$
+
 
/
.
$
+
 
 
1
$
+
 
$
$
$
+
 
 
.
$
+
 
%
1
$
+
.
$
+
￿
0
0
$
+
￿
￿
1
$
+
￿
0
.
$
+
.
%
￿
$
+
￿
$
 
$
+
#
-
.
$
+
￿
￿
-
$
+
.
 
.
$
+
#
/
1
$
+
#
1
$
$
+
￿
￿
%
$
+
.
 
#
$
+
0
$
+
%
0
0
$
+
%
.
#
$
+
%
1
$
$
+
0
0
-
$
+
%
$
/
$
+
%
$
1
$
+
%
0
 
$
+
0
.
$
$
+
.
1
.
$
+
%
$
#
$
+
%
%
.
$
+
0
￿
#
$
+
1
$
+
/
%
#
$
+
/
￿
-
$
+
/
0
1
$
+
1
.
 
$
+
/
$
0
$
+
/
$
0
$
+
/
%
$
$
+
1
 
0
$
+
0
1
￿
$
+
0
-
%
$
+
/
.
#
$
+
1
$
-
 
$
+
-
￿
0
$
+
-
$
0
$
+
-
#
#
$
+
-
/
￿
$
+
1
0
/
$
+
1
/
.
$
+
1
-
-
$
+
-
%
$
$
+
1
%
%
$
+
1
0
#
$
+
1
-
#
$
+
-
.
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
9
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
$
+
#
#
-
$
+
 
0
$
$
+
 
%
#
$
+
#
$
%
$
+
 
%
 
$
+
 
 
1
$
+
 
#
0
$
+
 
0
0
$
+
 
 
1
$
+
$
-
-
$
+
 
 
￿
$
+
 
%
0
$
+
.
$
+
￿
0
/
$
+
￿
#
-
$
+
￿
.
0
$
+
.
￿
#
$
+
#
-
#
$
+
#
1
.
$
+
￿
#
1
$
+
.
$
%
$
+
#
0
-
$
+
#
/
￿
$
+
￿
#
$
$
+
￿
-
.
$
+
0
$
+
%
%
%
$
+
%
#
 
$
+
%
0
#
$
+
0
#
￿
$
+
.
1
.
$
+
.
-
.
$
+
%
￿
$
$
+
0
$
/
$
+
.
0
-
$
+
.
/
￿
$
+
%
#
/
$
+
%
-
-
$
+
1
$
+
/
#
0
$
+
/
$
 
$
+
/
#
/
$
+
/
1
1
$
+
0
/
$
$
+
0
0
/
$
+
/
$
.
$
+
/
/
$
$
+
0
%
%
$
+
0
0
$
$
+
0
-
/
$
+
/
%
-
 
$
+
1
1
0
$
+
1
.
$
$
+
1
%
1
$
+
-
 
1
$
+
1
 
#
$
+
1
 
#
$
+
1
.
1
$
+
1
-
.
$
+
1
$
￿
$
+
1
$
%
$
+
1
￿
1
$
+
1
1
-
<
=
=
>
?
?
@
A
?
@
=
?
>
B
C
D
E
=
'
D
H
G
I
‹
I
‹
I￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
￿
￿
￿
￿
J
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
L
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
›
ﬁ
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
!
"
￿
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
&
’
￿
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
￿
￿
M
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
N
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
O
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
$
+
$
%
￿
$
+
$
%
 
$
+
$
0
$
$
+
$
/
#
$
+
$
%
￿
$
+
$
%
/
$
+
$
%
￿
$
+
$
0
 
$
+
$
0
$
$
+
$
0
.
$
+
$
0
%
$
+
$
%
￿
$
+
#
$
+
 
#
-
$
+
#
￿
/
$
+
.
￿
1
$
+
%
/
%
$
+
 
/
0
$
+
￿
%
0
$
+
0
0
%
$
+
/
￿
￿
$
+
#
0
$
$
+
%
#
￿
$
+
1
.
 
$
+
1
-
.
$
+
.
$
+
.
#
￿
$
+
0
1
#
$
+
1
-
#
$
+
-
 
-
$
+
0
￿
-
$
+
-
 
$
$
+
-
-
￿
$
+
-
-
 
$
+
1
%
$
$
+
-
1
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
0
$
+
/
 
1
$
+
1
-
 
$
+
-
1
.
$
+
-
1
1
$
+
-
 
#
$
+
-
-
%
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
-
-
￿
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
1
$
+
1
0
#
$
+
-
0
%
$
+
-
-
/
$
+
-
-
-
$
+
-
1
$
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
$
+
-
#
%
$
+
-
1
0
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
-
-
#
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
$
+
 
￿
-
$
+
#
#
1
$
+
.
￿
.
$
+
%
.
/
$
+
 
1
/
$
+
￿
/
￿
$
+
0
0
￿
$
+
/
$
/
$
+
#
0
1
$
+
%
$
$
$
+
1
.
$
$
+
1
-
#
$
+
.
$
+
.
$
#
$
+
0
/
$
$
+
1
/
#
$
+
1
-
1
$
+
0
$
-
$
+
1
-
%
$
+
-
-
$
$
+
-
1
1
$
+
1
#
￿
$
+
-
1
#
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
0
$
+
0
-
#
$
+
1
/
1
$
+
-
/
0
$
+
-
/
-
$
+
1
-
-
$
+
-
-
￿
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
-
1
%
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
1
$
+
1
#
-
$
+
-
%
#
$
+
-
-
#
$
+
-
-
%
$
+
-
0
0
$
+
-
-
1
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
$
+
-
$
 
$
+
-
1
$
$
+
-
-
-
$
+
-
-
-
$
+
-
1
1
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
P
C
@
C
C
Q
=
R
=
A
=
Q
C
@
=
S
>
Q
?
T
U
V
ﬂ
W
Y
Z
[
\
]
^
_
‘
V
W
Y
]
b
V
W
Y
c
d
e
=
Q
=
‘
V
W
Y
Z
f
g
f
h
i
j
k
K
l
V
W
Y
]
m
W
n
V
Y
o
c
n
V
Y
p
l
V
W
Y
q
r
r
s
t
k
u
p
v
o
c
^
w
x
C
y
=
z
@
?
Q
?
>
?
A
=
x
c
C
A
S
[
\
Z
{
v
}
|
~
￿
g
v
]
^
_
￿
^
G
b
W
Y
Z
f
g
f
h
￿
￿
j
k
K
￿
W
￿
V
Y
]
￿
V
W
Y
o
c
d
e
=
Q
=
￿
W
q
￿
￿
f
￿
￿
p
￿
￿
￿
￿
c
￿
V
Y
p
￿
V
W
Y
q
r
r
s
t
k
u
p
v
o
G
B
e
=
￿
–
<
=
x
@
w
T
C
@
w
?
A
x
￿
x
=
x
@
e
=
z
?
A
@
w
A
￿
?
￿
x
S
=
￿
=
A
S
=
A
@
y
C
Q
w
C
D
E
=
c
U
V
W
Y
G
￿
?
Q
@
e
=
=
x
@
w
T
C
@
w
?
A
x
c
C
x
￿
￿
Q
w
?
￿
x
z
?
A
@
C
R
w
?
A
S
￿
T
T
￿
d
C
x
C
S
S
=
S
C
A
S
@
e
=
z
?
T
T
?
A
>
C
z
@
?
Q
d
C
x
w
R
A
?
Q
=
S
G
B
e
=
Q
=
x
￿
E
@
x
w
A
@
e
=
@
C
D
E
=
C
Q
=
>
?
Q
@
e
=
z
?
A
@
C
R
w
?
A
z
?
=
￿
z
w
=
A
@
c
￿
￿
G
￿
C
Q
@
C
Q
=
￿
?
Q
@
x
@
e
=
D
w
C
x
?
>
@
e
=
z
?
=
￿
z
w
=
A
@
?
>
@
e
=
z
?
A
@
C
R
w
?
A
z
?
=
￿
z
w
=
A
@
c
w
G
=
G
￿
￿
V
￿
f
k
￿
￿
￿
V
￿
{
￿
\
o
￿
￿
c
C
A
S
@
e
=
Q
?
?
@
T
=
C
A
x
￿
￿
C
Q
=
=
Q
Q
?
Q
c
k
￿
￿
V
￿
f
k
￿
￿
￿
V
￿
{
￿
\
o
￿
￿
￿
o
f
￿
￿
c
d
e
=
Q
=
@
e
=
@
Q
￿
=
y
C
E
￿
=
￿
\
Z
u
w
A
@
e
=
P
￿
￿
C
A
S
¡
Z
v
p
¢
p
|
|
|
p
￿
d
w
@
e
￿
Z
¢
u
u
u
w
x
@
e
=
A
￿
T
D
=
Q
?
>
Q
=
￿
E
w
z
C
@
w
?
A
x
G
￿
C
Q
@
D
Q
=
￿
?
Q
@
x
@
e
=
?
A
=
£
x
w
S
=
S
Q
=
⁄
=
z
@
w
?
A
￿
Q
?
D
C
D
w
E
w
@
￿
c
d
e
w
z
e
w
x
S
=
¥
A
=
S
C
x
@
e
=
￿
Q
?
D
C
D
w
E
w
@
￿
@
e
C
@
@
e
=
ƒ
£
y
C
E
￿
=
w
x
E
C
Q
R
=
Q
@
e
C
A
@
e
=
~
§
¤
z
Q
w
@
w
z
C
E
y
C
E
￿
=
c
d
e
=
Q
=
@
e
=
Q
=
⁄
=
z
@
w
?
A
￿
Q
?
D
C
D
w
E
w
@
￿
￿
A
S
=
Q
￿
Z
u
w
x
@
e
=
x
w
“
=
C
A
S
￿
A
S
=
Q
￿
«
Z
u
@
e
=
￿
?
d
=
Q
G
I
‡
†￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
%
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
,
·
￿
￿
$
!
"
￿
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
&
’
￿
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
*
 
,
+
-
-
0
*
$
+
0
$
1
*
$
+
$
#
-
$
+
 
￿
0
*
 
,
+
 
$
1
*
$
+
$
/
 
*
$
+
$
 
 
$
+
$
/
0
*
$
+
￿
 
0
*
$
+
$
 
%
*
$
+
$
 
 
$
+
$
 
.
$
+
#
*
 
,
+
-
 
#
*
$
+
.
0
/
$
+
$
%
￿
$
+
 
-
0
*
$
+
-
 
￿
$
+
$
$
 
$
+
$
/
.
$
+
 
0
￿
*
$
+
#
￿
0
$
+
$
.
0
$
+
$
1
1
$
+
 
#
 
$
+
.
*
 
,
+
.
%
￿
*
$
+
#
￿
#
$
+
#
-
-
$
+
.
￿
.
*
$
+
0
#
-
$
+
 
/
$
$
+
#
1
#
$
+
￿
1
$
*
$
+
$
0
-
$
+
#
$
1
$
+
#
-
$
$
+
￿
/
/
$
+
0
*
 
,
+
 
1
 
$
+
$
#
0
$
+
%
.
%
$
+
0
/
%
*
$
+
￿
/
0
$
+
￿
-
￿
$
+
%
#
.
$
+
0
￿
￿
$
+
#
#
.
$
+
.
#
$
$
+
%
 
.
$
+
0
.
0
$
+
1
*
$
+
/
.
#
$
+
￿
/
$
$
+
/
%
 
$
+
1
-
 
*
$
+
$
￿
1
$
+
0
 
1
$
+
/
.
%
$
+
1
/
1
$
+
.
0
￿
$
+
0
 
/
$
+
/
￿
 
$
+
1
1
￿
 
*
$
+
.
#
%
$
+
%
1
.
$
+
-
0
.
 
,
+
$
/
-
$
+
￿
%
-
$
+
/
/
/
$
+
-
￿
%
 
,
+
$
0
%
$
+
0
0
 
$
+
/
-
￿
$
+
-
#
/
 
,
+
$
/
/
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
9
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
*
 
,
+
-
 
.
*
$
+
.
/
 
$
+
$
%
 
$
+
#
#
.
*
$
+
-
%
 
*
$
+
$
$
.
$
+
$
/
%
$
+
 
/
$
*
$
+
#
 
/
$
+
$
.
#
$
+
$
1
 
$
+
 
￿
#
$
+
.
*
 
,
+
%
0
.
*
$
+
#
/
-
$
+
#
%
0
$
+
￿
-
-
*
$
+
0
%
-
$
+
 
0
0
$
+
#
/
￿
$
+
￿
/
$
*
$
+
$
￿
1
$
+
 
-
.
$
+
#
/
#
$
+
￿
0
1
$
+
0
*
 
,
+
$
-
.
$
+
$
.
-
$
+
.
-
%
$
+
0
#
.
*
$
+
￿
￿
.
$
+
￿
0
/
$
+
%
$
#
$
+
%
-
1
$
+
#
 
#
$
+
.
$
#
$
+
.
-
0
$
+
0
$
/
$
+
1
*
$
+
/
￿
￿
$
+
#
.
1
$
+
0
-
 
$
+
1
￿
%
*
$
+
$
-
/
$
+
%
/
￿
$
+
0
1
1
$
+
1
 
#
$
+
.
 
￿
$
+
%
1
 
$
+
0
1
￿
$
+
1
$
.
 
*
$
+
%
0
￿
$
+
.
￿
1
$
+
1
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
￿
$
+
 
%
%
$
+
/
￿
$
$
+
1
%
$
$
+
-
-
￿
$
+
%
1
%
$
+
/
.
￿
$
+
1
%
#
$
+
-
1
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
￿
+
 
0
%
 
,
+
1
#
#
$
+
.
0
0
$
+
0
1
.
#
+
#
-
/
$
+
%
0
￿
$
+
#
0
 
$
+
#
-
 
 
,
+
 
0
 
$
+
#
0
#
$
+
 
1
￿
$
+
#
 
1
$
+
#
￿
+
 
0
0
 
,
+
/
 
#
$
+
.
1
%
$
+
0
.
-
#
+
 
%
 
$
+
%
%
0
$
+
#
1
 
$
+
￿
￿
0
 
,
+
 
.
-
$
+
#
0
0
$
+
#
$
%
$
+
#
%
￿
$
+
.
#
+
-
#
.
 
,
+
%
0
%
$
+
%
1
0
$
+
/
0
#
 
,
+
-
0
.
$
+
%
#
/
$
+
￿
-
%
$
+
.
1
%
 
,
+
$
1
/
$
+
￿
￿
￿
$
+
￿
.
￿
$
+
.
#
1
$
+
0
#
+
1
/
 
 
,
+
%
/
￿
$
+
/
.
￿
$
+
1
1
￿
 
,
+
1
%
$
$
+
0
$
1
$
+
%
-
￿
$
+
0
-
1
$
+
-
$
-
$
+
%
$
#
$
+
%
.
-
$
+
0
/
/
$
+
1
#
+
/
%
$
 
,
+
0
.
￿
$
+
-
%
$
 
,
+
$
0
0
 
,
+
0
0
$
$
+
/
-
-
$
+
1
$
#
$
+
-
#
%
$
+
1
/
￿
$
+
0
/
￿
$
+
/
%
-
$
+
-
$
%
 
#
+
/
 
%
 
,
+
/
/
1
 
,
+
 
0
#
 
,
+
#
.
.
 
,
+
%
1
$
$
+
-
 
￿
$
+
-
1
-
 
,
+
 
$
%
$
+
-
#
1
$
+
1
.
-
$
+
-
%
#
 
,
+
$
-
0
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
9
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
￿
+
 
%
-
 
,
+
0
1
￿
$
+
.
0
1
$
+
0
.
/
#
+
 
0
.
$
+
%
-
$
$
+
#
/
%
$
+
￿
.
$
 
,
+
 
￿
$
$
+
#
0
￿
$
+
#
$
 
$
+
#
0
$
$
+
.
#
+
-
0
$
 
,
+
0
￿
%
$
+
%
￿
/
$
+
/
 
$
 
,
+
-
/
.
$
+
%
 
/
$
+
￿
1
.
$
+
.
/
0
 
,
+
$
 
%
$
+
￿
.
%
$
+
￿
￿
#
$
+
.
#
.
$
+
0
#
+
1
￿
%
 
,
+
%
￿
0
$
+
/
 
 
$
+
1
0
1
 
,
+
1
 
1
$
+
%
1
 
$
+
%
1
$
$
+
0
0
0
$
+
1
1
1
$
+
.
1
0
$
+
%
￿
.
$
+
0
.
 
$
+
1
#
+
0
-
/
 
,
+
0
 
.
$
+
1
/
￿
 
,
+
$
.
$
 
,
+
/
0
%
$
+
/
0
 
$
+
/
%
#
$
+
1
0
%
$
+
-
￿
$
$
+
0
.
.
$
+
/
 
￿
$
+
1
￿
$
 
#
+
0
%
 
 
,
+
/
￿
$
 
,
+
$
-
￿
 
,
+
 
.
0
 
,
+
0
1
1
$
+
1
/
%
$
+
-
$
0
 
,
+
$
￿
1
$
+
-
%
0
$
+
/
-
1
$
+
1
1
$
 
,
+
$
$
￿
<
=
=
>
?
?
@
A
?
@
=
@
?
B
C
D
E
=
F
D
†￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
%
￿
￿
￿
￿
J
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
L
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
+
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
,
·
￿
￿
$
!
"
￿
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
&
’
￿
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
￿
￿
M
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
N
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
O
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
$
+
$
/
1
$
+
 
$
#
$
+
 
 
$
$
+
 
￿
0
$
+
$
1
/
$
+
 
 
0
$
+
 
#
￿
$
+
 
/
￿
$
+
$
-
/
$
+
 
 
#
$
+
 
 
.
$
+
 
%
 
$
+
#
$
+
$
1
0
$
+
 
#
#
$
+
 
%
-
$
+
 
1
1
$
+
 
 
#
$
+
 
#
-
$
+
#
$
/
$
+
#
0
0
$
+
 
.
#
$
+
 
/
/
$
+
#
/
#
$
+
￿
 
#
$
+
.
$
+
 
￿
.
$
+
 
1
0
$
+
￿
#
 
$
+
.
$
.
$
+
 
/
-
$
+
#
/
-
$
+
.
/
.
$
+
%
-
0
$
+
#
￿
$
$
+
￿
0
1
$
+
0
/
1
$
+
1
$
.
$
+
0
$
+
 
1
#
$
+
￿
$
/
$
+
%
#
-
$
+
0
￿
-
$
+
#
0
.
$
+
.
1
￿
$
+
1
$
 
$
+
1
1
/
$
+
￿
-
-
$
+
0
/
$
$
+
-
%
%
$
+
-
1
1
$
+
1
$
+
#
.
-
$
+
.
￿
 
$
+
0
1
%
$
+
1
$
/
$
+
￿
0
 
$
+
0
-
$
$
+
-
#
-
$
+
-
1
.
$
+
%
/
%
$
+
1
/
￿
$
+
-
-
%
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
$
+
￿
$
-
$
+
%
$
￿
$
+
/
1
0
$
+
1
1
.
$
+
%
 
%
$
+
/
/
-
$
+
-
/
1
$
+
-
-
%
$
+
/
$
%
$
+
-
.
￿
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
$
+
$
1
0
$
+
 
#
￿
$
+
 
%
0
$
+
#
$
%
$
+
 
 
/
$
+
 
.
#
$
+
 
-
/
$
+
#
-
.
$
+
 
#
 
$
+
 
0
￿
$
+
#
%
 
$
+
￿
￿
0
$
+
.
$
+
 
#
 
$
+
 
1
#
$
+
#
1
0
$
+
￿
1
%
$
+
 
/
/
$
+
#
%
.
$
+
.
%
%
$
+
0
$
 
$
+
#
#
1
$
+
￿
%
 
$
+
0
.
 
$
+
/
0
.
$
+
0
$
+
 
1
￿
$
+
#
/
/
$
+
.
1
/
$
+
%
-
-
$
+
#
0
-
$
+
.
%
$
$
+
/
0
/
$
+
1
0
%
$
+
￿
/
.
$
+
0
0
￿
$
+
-
￿
#
$
+
-
/
￿
$
+
1
$
+
#
.
%
$
+
￿
-
%
$
+
0
.
/
$
+
/
0
$
$
+
￿
0
￿
$
+
0
%
-
$
+
-
 
$
$
+
-
0
0
$
+
%
0
#
$
+
1
%
 
$
+
-
1
0
$
+
-
-
1
 
$
+
#
-
%
$
+
.
%
1
$
+
/
%
.
$
+
1
/
#
$
+
.
%
1
$
+
/
%
0
$
+
-
0
/
$
+
-
-
￿
$
+
0
%
%
$
+
-
.
$
$
+
-
-
1
$
+
-
-
-
<
=
=
>
?
?
@
A
?
@
=
?
>
B
C
D
E
=
F
D
H
G
†
¶
I￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
0
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
›
ﬁ
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
,
·
￿
￿
$
!
"
￿
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
&
’
￿
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
*
$
+
$
$
0
*
$
+
$
$
#
*
$
+
$
 
$
*
$
+
$
$
$
*
$
+
$
$
#
$
+
$
$
#
*
$
+
$
$
.
$
+
$
$
#
$
+
$
$
 
*
$
+
$
$
#
*
$
+
$
$
 
*
$
+
$
$
 
$
+
#
$
+
$
0
#
$
+
$
0
 
$
+
$
1
#
$
+
 
#
0
$
+
$
%
1
$
+
$
0
0
$
+
$
1
.
$
+
 
#
.
$
+
$
0
#
$
+
$
0
%
$
+
$
1
/
$
+
 
#
.
$
+
.
$
+
#
 
#
$
+
#
#
 
$
+
#
/
%
$
+
￿
/
 
$
+
#
$
.
$
+
#
#
￿
$
+
#
/
/
$
+
￿
0
1
$
+
#
$
0
$
+
#
#
0
$
+
#
1
#
$
+
￿
0
%
$
+
0
$
+
￿
-
 
$
+
.
 
/
$
+
.
1
1
$
+
%
-
#
$
+
￿
1
￿
$
+
.
 
.
$
+
.
1
.
$
+
%
1
%
$
+
￿
1
%
$
+
.
 
0
$
+
.
1
#
$
+
%
1
1
$
+
1
$
+
%
/
1
$
+
0
$
.
$
+
0
0
.
$
+
/
0
.
$
+
%
%
.
$
+
%
-
#
$
+
0
0
 
$
+
/
%
#
$
+
%
0
 
$
+
%
-
#
$
+
0
0
 
$
+
/
0
￿
 
$
+
/
#
-
$
+
/
.
#
$
+
/
-
/
$
+
1
1
 
$
+
/
 
#
$
+
/
￿
 
$
+
1
$
#
$
+
1
1
0
$
+
/
$
0
$
+
/
￿
0
$
+
1
$
￿
$
+
1
-
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
9
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
$
+
$
%
%
$
+
$
0
%
$
+
$
1
 
$
+
 
#
.
$
+
$
0
 
$
+
$
0
0
$
+
$
1
￿
$
+
 
#
#
$
+
$
%
-
$
+
$
0
.
$
+
$
1
0
$
+
 
#
.
$
+
.
$
+
#
$
/
$
+
#
 
#
$
+
#
0
.
$
+
￿
.
1
$
+
 
-
1
$
+
#
 
#
$
+
#
0
/
$
+
￿
.
/
$
+
#
$
$
$
+
#
 
0
$
+
#
0
1
$
+
￿
%
.
$
+
0
$
+
￿
/
$
$
+
￿
-
.
$
+
.
.
1
$
+
%
%
1
$
+
￿
%
-
$
+
￿
-
$
$
+
.
0
-
$
+
%
%
.
$
+
￿
0
.
$
+
￿
-
0
$
+
.
0
 
$
+
%
%
0
$
+
1
$
+
%
.
$
$
+
%
%
$
$
+
0
 
/
$
+
/
 
#
$
+
%
#
 
$
+
%
0
￿
$
+
0
 
0
$
+
/
 
#
$
+
%
￿
$
$
+
%
%
#
$
+
0
#
#
$
+
/
 
%
 
$
+
0
/
%
$
+
0
/
%
$
+
/
%
.
$
+
1
.
 
$
+
0
%
/
$
+
0
1
1
$
+
/
%
.
$
+
1
.
#
$
+
0
/
 
$
+
0
-
$
$
+
/
%
$
$
+
1
.
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
$
+
 
1
#
$
+
 
 
$
$
+
$
1
 
$
+
$
1
0
$
+
 
 
1
$
+
$
0
1
$
+
$
.
1
$
+
$
%
#
$
+
$
1
 
$
+
$
.
1
$
+
$
￿
#
$
+
$
.
$
$
+
#
$
+
#
 
0
$
+
 
%
 
$
+
 
.
1
$
+
#
$
0
$
+
 
.
0
$
+
 
$
-
$
+
 
 
 
$
+
 
0
$
$
+
 
 
 
$
+
$
1
-
$
+
 
$
 
$
+
 
.
￿
$
+
.
$
+
￿
￿
%
$
+
#
-
￿
$
+
￿
#
1
$
+
.
￿
￿
$
+
#
0
/
$
+
#
%
#
$
+
#
-
/
$
+
￿
-
#
$
+
#
￿
.
$
+
#
.
#
$
+
#
-
#
$
+
￿
/
/
$
+
0
$
+
.
-
1
$
+
.
1
 
$
+
%
￿
￿
$
+
0
.
￿
$
+
.
￿
#
$
+
.
.
$
$
+
%
$
 
$
+
0
$
%
$
+
.
 
$
$
+
.
#
-
$
+
.
-
 
$
+
%
-
1
$
+
1
$
+
0
/
-
$
+
0
0
/
$
+
/
 
 
$
+
1
$
-
$
+
0
$
$
$
+
0
 
/
$
+
0
/
-
$
+
/
/
$
$
+
%
1
#
$
+
0
$
%
$
+
0
0
-
$
+
/
/
#
 
$
+
1
 
-
$
+
1
$
0
$
+
1
.
#
$
+
-
#
/
$
+
/
%
#
$
+
/
%
0
$
+
1
#
$
$
+
-
$
￿
$
+
/
#
%
$
+
/
.
-
$
+
1
 
#
$
+
-
$
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
9
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
$
+
#
 
%
$
+
 
%
1
$
+
 
.
/
$
+
#
$
0
$
+
 
.
1
$
+
 
 
$
$
+
 
 
$
$
+
 
%
0
$
+
 
$
1
$
+
$
1
0
$
+
 
$
$
$
+
 
.
￿
$
+
.
$
+
￿
￿
#
$
+
#
1
1
$
+
￿
 
1
$
+
.
 
.
$
+
#
0
#
$
+
#
.
%
$
+
#
1
-
$
+
￿
/
.
$
+
#
￿
%
$
+
#
￿
￿
$
+
#
1
$
$
+
￿
0
/
$
+
0
$
+
.
1
.
$
+
.
0
#
$
+
.
-
1
$
+
0
 
0
$
+
.
 
#
$
+
.
 
1
$
+
.
1
/
$
+
%
/
%
$
+
￿
-
#
$
+
.
 
#
$
+
.
/
 
$
+
%
0
0
$
+
1
$
+
0
.
%
$
+
0
 
%
$
+
0
0
￿
$
+
/
0
￿
$
+
%
/
 
$
+
%
-
#
$
+
0
￿
0
$
+
/
￿
#
$
+
%
%
.
$
+
%
0
0
$
+
0
￿
 
$
+
/
#
%
 
$
+
/
/
%
$
+
/
.
 
$
+
1
$
 
$
+
1
1
1
$
+
/
$
%
$
+
/
 
.
$
+
/
/
￿
$
+
1
0
$
$
+
0
-
.
$
+
/
$
￿
$
+
/
%
-
$
+
1
%
 
<
=
=
>
?
?
@
A
?
@
=
@
?
B
C
D
E
=
'
D
†
¶
I
‹
I￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
0
￿
￿
￿
￿
J
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
L
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
›
ﬁ
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
,
·
￿
￿
$
!
"
￿
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
&
’
￿
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
￿
￿
M
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
N
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
O
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
$
+
$
%
￿
$
+
$
.
-
$
+
$
.
0
$
+
$
/
$
$
+
$
%
#
$
+
$
0
$
$
+
$
%
0
$
+
$
0
0
$
+
$
%
0
$
+
$
%
/
$
+
$
%
￿
$
+
$
/
 
$
+
#
$
+
 
￿
-
$
+
#
$
.
$
+
￿
-
 
$
+
%
 
$
$
+
 
0
￿
$
+
￿
 
￿
$
+
%
0
-
$
+
0
1
%
$
+
#
 
1
$
+
.
#
/
$
+
/
0
.
$
+
1
￿
#
$
+
.
$
+
￿
/
$
$
+
%
1
.
$
+
1
#
1
$
+
1
1
1
$
+
%
.
￿
$
+
1
￿
$
$
+
-
/
￿
$
+
-
1
$
$
+
/
.
0
$
+
-
0
$
$
+
-
-
1
$
+
-
-
1
$
+
0
$
+
0
#
1
$
+
1
%
￿
$
+
-
0
#
$
+
-
/
#
$
+
1
￿
0
$
+
-
/
-
$
+
-
-
-
$
+
-
-
-
$
+
-
0
#
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
1
$
+
1
$
#
$
+
-
￿
￿
$
+
-
1
1
$
+
-
-
￿
$
+
-
.
0
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
-
-
0
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
$
+
1
1
0
$
+
-
0
.
$
+
-
-
/
$
+
-
-
1
$
+
-
-
$
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
$
+
 
#
/
$
+
#
 
-
$
+
￿
1
-
$
+
%
$
/
$
+
 
0
$
$
+
￿
$
%
$
+
%
0
 
$
+
0
1
￿
$
+
#
$
.
$
+
.
#
.
$
+
/
.
0
$
+
1
.
$
$
+
.
$
+
￿
%
.
$
+
%
/
.
$
+
1
$
1
$
+
1
0
 
$
+
%
#
 
$
+
/
-
1
$
+
-
0
￿
$
+
-
/
 
$
+
/
 
.
$
+
-
%
.
$
+
-
-
/
$
+
-
-
1
$
+
0
$
+
0
$
.
$
+
1
#
1
$
+
-
￿
1
$
+
-
0
$
$
+
1
$
/
$
+
-
0
/
$
+
-
-
1
$
+
-
-
-
$
+
-
.
-
$
+
-
-
1
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
1
$
+
/
/
$
$
+
-
 
￿
$
+
-
1
/
$
+
-
1
￿
$
+
-
 
1
$
+
-
-
0
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
-
-
#
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
$
+
1
%
/
$
+
-
%
#
$
+
-
-
.
$
+
-
-
/
$
+
-
0
%
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
-
-
1
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
<
=
=
>
?
?
@
A
?
@
=
?
>
B
C
D
E
=
'
D
H
G
†
•
I
a
I
‹
I￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
/
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
,
·
￿
￿
$
,
‚
%
!
"
￿
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
&
’
￿
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
*
 
,
+
#
￿
 
*
$
+
#
￿
.
*
$
+
$
#
￿
*
$
+
$
$
/
*
$
+
￿
#
.
*
$
+
$
#
/
*
$
+
$
 
$
*
$
+
$
$
0
*
$
+
$
/
#
*
$
+
$
 
%
*
$
+
$
$
 
*
$
+
$
 
.
$
+
#
*
 
,
+
 
#
￿
*
$
+
 
.
1
$
+
$
.
1
$
+
 
$
/
*
$
+
#
%
1
$
+
$
￿
$
$
+
$
0
0
$
+
$
1
$
$
+
$
$
/
$
+
$
.
-
-
$
+
$
/
#
$
+
$
-
/
$
+
.
*
$
+
1
0
1
$
+
$
%
-
$
+
#
.
/
$
+
￿
￿
.
*
$
+
$
$
0
$
+
 
-
0
$
+
#
0
.
$
+
￿
 
.
$
+
 
%
-
$
+
#
 
/
$
+
#
0
￿
$
+
￿
#
 
$
+
0
*
$
+
.
%
$
$
+
#
￿
%
$
+
%
 
￿
$
+
%
/
1
$
+
#
#
￿
$
+
￿
-
0
$
+
.
-
$
$
+
%
0
0
$
+
￿
.
.
$
+
.
$
-
$
+
.
-
%
$
+
%
/
.
$
+
1
*
$
+
 
$
%
$
+
%
#
%
$
+
/
 
1
$
+
1
.
$
$
+
￿
0
 
$
+
%
-
￿
$
+
0
-
￿
$
+
/
-
.
$
+
%
#
%
$
+
%
-
/
$
+
/
$
$
$
+
/
-
-
 
$
+
 
0
#
$
+
/
$
%
$
+
-
￿
 
 
,
+
$
0
 
$
+
%
/
$
$
+
/
0
#
$
+
1
1
.
 
,
+
$
$
.
$
+
0
1
.
$
+
/
/
#
$
+
1
/
%
$
+
-
1
.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
9
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
*
 
,
+
 
 
$
*
$
+
 
.
 
$
+
$
0
$
$
+
 
#
￿
*
$
+
#
0
-
$
+
$
#
1
$
+
$
0
1
$
+
$
0
/
$
+
$
$
-
$
+
$
%
#
$
+
$
/
1
$
+
$
-
 
$
+
.
*
$
+
/
1
#
*
$
+
$
 
.
$
+
#
0
1
$
+
￿
$
.
*
$
+
$
￿
$
$
+
 
1
.
$
+
#
%
 
$
+
#
-
￿
$
+
 
.
.
$
+
#
 
￿
$
+
#
%
.
$
+
￿
$
0
$
+
0
*
$
+
.
-
%
$
+
#
#
1
$
+
.
/
$
$
+
%
#
-
$
+
 
0
-
$
+
￿
/
1
$
+
.
/
%
$
+
%
￿
#
$
+
￿
￿
/
$
+
.
$
$
$
+
.
%
/
$
+
%
 
/
$
+
1
*
$
+
#
$
%
$
+
.
#
-
$
+
0
￿
%
$
+
/
/
 
$
+
￿
1
#
$
+
%
.
-
$
+
0
.
$
$
+
/
#
0
$
+
%
 
 
$
+
%
0
.
$
+
0
.
.
$
+
/
#
-
 
$
+
 
￿
%
$
+
0
 
0
$
+
1
%
$
$
+
-
0
0
$
+
.
-
.
$
+
/
#
.
$
+
1
$
$
$
+
1
-
￿
$
+
0
0
￿
$
+
/
$
.
$
+
1
$
#
$
+
1
-
1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
#
+
0
 
￿
 
,
+
 
￿
/
$
+
.
1
/
$
+
0
.
1
 
,
+
#
0
 
$
+
￿
#
/
$
+
#
%
￿
$
+
#
-
 
$
+
%
.
1
$
+
#
 
-
$
+
 
/
%
$
+
#
$
$
$
+
#
#
+
%
1
1
 
,
+
 
￿
-
$
+
%
 
%
$
+
0
1
/
 
,
+
 
-
￿
$
+
￿
￿
#
$
+
#
1
$
$
+
#
-
￿
$
+
.
￿
￿
$
+
#
#
￿
$
+
 
1
0
$
+
#
 
#
$
+
.
#
+
%
#
-
 
,
+
#
$
#
$
+
%
1
￿
$
+
/
$
#
 
,
+
$
#
0
$
+
￿
1
1
$
+
￿
/
0
$
+
.
 
1
$
+
.
#
#
$
+
￿
 
1
$
+
￿
#
#
$
+
￿
/
%
$
+
0
#
+
￿
$
-
 
,
+
 
0
-
$
+
1
 
$
$
+
1
1
/
$
+
-
/
 
$
+
%
￿
0
$
+
%
0
￿
$
+
0
￿
￿
$
+
%
0
￿
$
+
.
/
0
$
+
%
￿
￿
$
+
0
$
%
$
+
1
#
+
#
 
%
 
,
+
￿
/
%
$
+
-
0
$
 
,
+
$
1
1
 
,
+
$
.
-
$
+
/
$
%
$
+
/
%
0
$
+
1
.
0
$
+
0
￿
 
$
+
0
.
/
$
+
/
#
-
$
+
1
#
%
 
#
+
#
-
%
 
,
+
%
#
1
 
,
+
#
 
$
 
,
+
￿
$
%
 
,
+
 
$
 
$
+
1
/
1
$
+
-
.
#
 
,
+
$
%
 
$
+
/
-
1
$
+
1
 
0
$
+
-
$
 
 
,
+
$
$
0
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
9
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
#
+
0
$
%
 
,
+
$
1
.
$
+
.
1
$
$
+
/
 
%
 
,
+
 
-
1
$
+
￿
￿
 
$
+
#
0
￿
$
+
#
-
#
$
+
.
￿
%
$
+
#
#
%
$
+
 
-
￿
$
+
#
 
￿
$
+
.
#
+
%
$
/
 
,
+
#
#
$
$
+
0
 
$
$
+
/
#
 
 
,
+
$
1
-
$
+
￿
-
#
$
+
￿
0
%
$
+
.
$
#
$
+
.
￿
$
$
+
￿
 
%
$
+
￿
 
￿
$
+
￿
0
$
$
+
0
#
+
￿
#
/
 
,
+
 
#
%
$
+
/
0
.
$
+
1
 
0
 
,
+
$
￿
/
$
+
%
.
.
$
+
%
%
%
$
+
0
$
.
$
+
%
.
￿
$
+
.
0
1
$
+
.
-
0
$
+
%
%
/
$
+
1
#
+
￿
#
 
 
,
+
￿
 
1
$
+
-
 
#
 
,
+
$
.
-
 
,
+
$
#
.
$
+
0
0
.
$
+
/
 
$
$
+
/
1
#
$
+
0
0
/
$
+
0
 
-
$
+
0
/
/
$
+
/
%
0
 
#
+
￿
/
#
 
,
+
%
$
%
 
,
+
$
-
0
 
,
+
#
.
0
 
,
+
 
0
%
$
+
1
.
￿
$
+
1
0
%
$
+
-
.
￿
$
+
/
1
 
$
+
/
%
0
$
+
1
￿
￿
$
+
-
#
￿
<
=
=
>
?
?
@
A
?
@
=
@
?
B
C
D
E
=
F
D
I
”
„￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
/
￿
￿
￿
￿
J
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
L
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
,
·
￿
￿
$
,
‚
%
!
"
￿
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
&
’
￿
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
￿
￿
M
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
N
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
O
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
$
+
$
/
 
$
+
$
1
#
$
+
$
-
.
$
+
$
1
#
$
+
 
$
￿
$
+
$
-
-
$
+
 
$
￿
$
+
 
#
1
$
+
 
$
%
$
+
$
-
0
$
+
 
 
1
$
+
 
 
￿
$
+
#
$
+
$
1
$
$
+
 
$
-
$
+
 
￿
-
$
+
 
%
$
$
+
 
 
1
$
+
 
.
$
$
+
 
-
#
$
+
#
$
 
$
+
 
%
$
$
+
 
0
0
$
+
#
#
$
$
+
#
/
.
$
+
.
$
+
 
#
1
$
+
#
$
 
$
+
#
/
%
$
+
￿
￿
0
$
+
#
 
#
$
+
#
-
#
$
+
.
%
0
$
+
%
.
/
$
+
#
0
$
$
+
.
#
#
$
+
0
￿
 
$
+
/
￿
/
$
+
0
$
+
 
-
#
$
+
￿
$
#
$
+
.
-
 
$
+
%
.
%
$
+
￿
.
/
$
+
%
 
1
$
+
/
/
#
$
+
1
%
#
$
+
.
1
1
$
+
/
￿
#
$
+
-
#
-
$
+
-
/
-
$
+
1
$
+
#
0
.
$
+
.
%
$
$
+
0
%
￿
$
+
/
￿
￿
$
+
.
%
#
$
+
/
$
0
$
+
-
 
0
$
+
-
/
￿
$
+
0
0
1
$
+
-
 
 
$
+
-
-
￿
$
+
-
-
-
 
$
+
￿
.
1
$
+
%
#
/
$
+
/
.
0
$
+
1
.
0
$
+
%
1
/
$
+
1
#
.
$
+
-
/
.
$
+
-
-
#
$
+
1
 
#
$
+
-
0
1
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
$
+
$
1
-
$
+
 
#
%
$
+
 
.
1
$
+
 
.
%
$
+
 
 
1
$
+
 
￿
0
$
+
 
0
-
$
+
 
-
#
$
+
 
%
 
$
+
 
0
#
$
+
#
￿
%
$
+
#
/
 
$
+
.
$
+
 
￿
-
$
+
 
-
1
$
+
#
1
#
$
+
#
-
1
$
+
#
 
0
$
+
#
-
 
$
+
.
.
 
$
+
.
-
.
$
+
#
%
.
$
+
.
￿
 
$
+
0
 
%
$
+
/
 
0
$
+
0
$
+
 
-
-
$
+
#
-
#
$
+
.
0
%
$
+
%
#
￿
$
+
￿
#
-
$
+
%
$
.
$
+
/
.
1
$
+
1
#
$
$
+
.
1
1
$
+
/
#
$
$
+
-
$
0
$
+
-
.
1
$
+
1
$
+
#
/
 
$
+
￿
-
/
$
+
%
1
.
$
+
0
1
/
$
+
.
0
%
$
+
0
/
1
$
+
1
/
#
$
+
-
%
$
$
+
0
/
$
$
+
1
1
￿
$
+
-
1
-
$
+
-
-
%
 
$
+
￿
￿
$
$
+
.
-
0
$
+
/
 
$
$
+
/
-
-
$
+
%
.
-
$
+
1
$
￿
$
+
-
.
.
$
+
-
1
1
$
+
/
/
￿
$
+
-
%
 
$
+
-
-
1
 
,
+
$
$
$
<
=
=
>
?
?
@
A
?
@
=
?
>
B
C
D
E
=
F
D
H
G
„￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
›
ﬁ
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
,
·
￿
￿
$
,
‚
%
!
"
￿
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
&
’
￿
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
*
$
+
$
$
0
*
$
+
$
$
%
*
$
+
$
$
￿
*
$
+
$
$
%
$
+
$
$
 
$
+
$
$
#
*
$
+
$
$
 
*
$
+
$
$
#
$
+
$
$
 
*
$
+
$
$
￿
*
$
+
$
$
 
*
$
+
$
$
#
$
+
#
$
+
$
.
%
$
+
$
%
-
$
+
$
0
1
$
+
$
1
 
$
+
$
%
/
$
+
$
0
#
$
+
$
/
 
$
+
$
1
.
$
+
$
%
/
$
+
$
0
#
$
+
$
/
#
$
+
$
1
￿
$
+
.
$
+
 
-
￿
$
+
#
 
%
$
+
#
.
#
$
+
#
/
-
$
+
#
$
0
$
+
#
#
#
$
+
#
.
/
$
+
#
/
%
$
+
#
$
1
$
+
#
 
1
$
+
#
.
.
$
+
#
/
-
$
+
0
$
+
￿
-
￿
$
+
.
$
%
$
+
.
￿
1
$
+
.
/
 
$
+
￿
-
 
$
+
￿
-
-
$
+
.
.
￿
$
+
.
1
$
$
+
￿
-
#
$
+
.
$
%
$
+
.
.
$
$
+
.
1
 
$
+
1
$
+
%
/
%
$
+
%
/
￿
$
+
0
 
1
$
+
0
%
$
$
+
%
%
0
$
+
%
1
.
$
+
0
$
/
$
+
0
%
 
$
+
%
%
1
$
+
%
/
-
$
+
0
 
.
$
+
0
%
$
 
$
+
/
#
%
$
+
/
$
/
$
+
/
%
￿
$
+
/
-
-
$
+
/
 
 
$
+
/
#
.
$
+
/
%
 
$
+
/
1
0
$
+
/
$
/
$
+
/
#
$
$
+
/
.
%
$
+
/
1
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
9
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
$
+
$
%
#
$
+
$
%
-
$
+
$
0
-
$
+
$
1
 
$
+
$
%
.
$
+
$
0
 
$
+
$
0
-
$
+
$
1
$
$
+
$
%
1
$
+
$
0
 
$
+
$
/
#
$
+
$
1
#
$
+
.
$
+
 
-
1
$
+
#
 
#
$
+
#
￿
/
$
+
#
%
0
$
+
#
$
0
$
+
#
$
1
$
+
#
￿
$
$
+
#
0
￿
$
+
#
$
#
$
+
#
 
$
$
+
#
￿
%
$
+
#
0
#
$
+
0
$
+
￿
/
1
$
+
￿
/
.
$
+
.
 
 
$
+
.
￿
/
$
+
￿
0
.
$
+
￿
1
￿
$
+
.
 
0
$
+
.
.
0
$
+
￿
0
1
$
+
￿
1
/
$
+
.
 
#
$
+
.
.
0
$
+
1
$
+
%
.
#
$
+
%
#
 
$
+
%
%
1
$
+
0
$
.
$
+
%
￿
0
$
+
%
.
$
$
+
%
/
%
$
+
%
-
-
$
+
%
#
.
$
+
%
.
 
$
+
%
0
1
$
+
0
$
%
 
$
+
0
0
/
$
+
0
0
/
$
+
0
1
.
$
+
/
#
￿
$
+
0
%
￿
$
+
0
/
$
$
+
0
-
.
$
+
/
#
1
$
+
0
0
/
$
+
0
/
$
$
+
0
-
-
$
+
/
￿
#
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
$
+
 
1
￿
$
+
 
 
.
$
+
$
/
0
$
+
$
0
-
$
+
 
 
.
$
+
$
0
1
$
+
$
.
.
$
+
$
.
$
$
+
$
1
 
$
+
$
%
$
$
+
$
￿
#
$
+
$
#
1
$
+
#
$
+
#
 
￿
$
+
 
%
0
$
+
 
￿
/
$
+
 
%
1
$
+
 
.
￿
$
+
 
$
-
$
+
 
$
#
$
+
 
 
%
$
+
 
$
1
$
+
$
1
/
$
+
$
1
1
$
+
$
-
-
$
+
.
$
+
￿
 
.
$
+
#
-
$
$
+
#
-
1
$
+
￿
.
.
$
+
#
0
 
$
+
#
%
#
$
+
#
/
$
$
+
￿
$
$
$
+
#
￿
1
$
+
#
￿
.
$
+
#
%
0
$
+
#
-
 
$
+
0
$
+
.
-
-
$
+
.
/
￿
$
+
.
-
#
$
+
%
#
-
$
+
.
￿
.
$
+
.
#
0
$
+
.
0
￿
$
+
%
$
#
$
+
.
 
%
$
+
.
 
-
$
+
.
%
$
$
+
.
-
 
$
+
1
$
+
0
/
#
$
+
0
.
$
$
+
0
/
 
$
+
/
$
.
$
+
%
-
1
$
+
0
$
-
$
+
0
#
/
$
+
0
/
 
$
+
%
/
/
$
+
%
-
#
$
+
0
#
.
$
+
0
0
$
 
$
+
1
$
0
$
+
/
/
.
$
+
1
$
￿
$
+
1
.
0
$
+
/
.
/
$
+
/
%
$
$
+
/
0
-
$
+
1
$
%
$
+
/
#
%
$
+
/
￿
#
$
+
/
%
/
$
+
/
-
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
9
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
$
+
#
 
1
$
+
 
%
1
$
+
 
￿
0
$
+
 
%
0
$
+
 
.
$
$
+
 
$
1
$
+
$
-
1
$
+
 
 
#
$
+
 
 
$
$
+
$
1
/
$
+
$
1
1
$
+
$
-
1
$
+
.
$
+
￿
#
$
$
+
#
-
 
$
+
#
-
/
$
+
￿
#
/
$
+
#
0
%
$
+
#
.
#
$
+
#
%
0
$
+
#
1
1
$
+
#
￿
.
$
+
#
#
/
$
+
#
.
/
$
+
#
/
%
$
+
0
$
+
.
1
￿
$
+
.
.
1
$
+
.
0
#
$
+
.
-
/
$
+
.
 
￿
$
+
.
 
%
$
+
.
￿
0
$
+
.
0
-
$
+
￿
-
.
$
+
.
$
￿
$
+
.
#
￿
$
+
.
%
1
$
+
1
$
+
0
.
1
$
+
%
-
.
$
+
0
 
#
$
+
0
0
$
$
+
%
1
$
$
+
%
0
/
$
+
%
-
0
$
+
0
#
$
$
+
%
.
1
$
+
%
%
%
$
+
%
/
-
$
+
0
 
%
 
$
+
/
0
/
$
+
/
￿
-
$
+
/
￿
-
$
+
/
/
0
$
+
0
-
-
$
+
/
$
$
$
+
/
 
0
$
+
/
.
1
$
+
0
-
$
$
+
0
1
0
$
+
/
$
-
$
+
/
.
￿
<
=
=
>
?
?
@
A
?
@
=
?
>
B
C
D
E
=
'
D
„
»
I￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
￿
￿
￿
￿
J
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
L
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
›
ﬁ
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
#
,
·
￿
￿
$
,
‚
%
!
"
￿
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
&
’
￿
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
 
$
#
$
%
$
 
$
$
￿
￿
M
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
N
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
O
￿
￿
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
$
$
+
$
.
/
$
+
$
%
$
$
+
$
%
.
$
+
$
0
$
$
+
$
0
 
$
+
$
%
0
$
+
$
.
/
$
+
$
.
 
$
+
$
0
 
$
+
$
%
 
$
+
$
0
$
$
+
$
.
-
$
+
#
$
+
 
#
$
$
+
 
-
.
$
+
￿
%
￿
$
+
.
0
$
$
+
 
/
 
$
+
#
1
/
$
+
%
$
%
$
+
0
 
/
$
+
#
#
.
$
+
.
$
#
$
+
0
/
1
$
+
/
0
%
$
+
.
$
+
￿
.
$
$
+
%
0
-
$
+
/
/
#
$
+
1
#
/
$
+
%
0
$
$
+
1
￿
0
$
+
-
%
#
$
+
-
0
.
$
+
/
0
.
$
+
-
.
1
$
+
-
-
￿
$
+
-
-
/
$
+
0
$
+
0
￿
￿
$
+
1
#
-
$
+
-
#
1
$
+
-
.
1
$
+
1
0
1
$
+
-
/
1
$
+
-
-
%
$
+
-
-
1
$
+
-
/
1
$
+
-
-
/
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
1
$
+
1
$
/
$
+
-
#
￿
$
+
-
/
￿
$
+
-
/
-
$
+
-
%
 
$
+
-
-
/
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
-
-
/
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
$
+
1
-
%
$
+
-
%
#
$
+
-
1
1
$
+
-
-
.
$
+
-
1
1
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
)
￿
&
2
3
4
5
6
7
&
8
:
7
&
;
$
+
#
$
+
 
#
$
$
+
#
$
1
$
+
￿
.
%
$
+
.
%
-
$
+
 
%
￿
$
+
#
-
.
$
+
.
1
0
$
+
0
$
.
$
+
#
#
￿
$
+
￿
-
-
$
+
0
/
%
$
+
/
0
 
$
+
.
$
+
￿
￿
0
$
+
%
0
.
$
+
/
%
.
$
+
/
1
1
$
+
%
%
 
$
+
/
1
#
$
+
-
#
 
$
+
-
%
.
$
+
/
￿
1
$
+
-
￿
0
$
+
-
-
￿
$
+
-
-
/
$
+
0
$
+
0
 
%
$
+
/
-
#
$
+
-
#
$
$
+
-
￿
%
$
+
1
#
￿
$
+
-
0
 
$
+
-
-
/
$
+
-
-
0
$
+
-
%
-
$
+
-
-
1
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
1
$
+
/
0
%
$
+
1
-
%
$
+
-
/
$
$
+
-
/
#
$
+
-
.
/
$
+
-
-
.
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
-
-
.
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
$
+
1
%
￿
$
+
-
.
 
$
+
-
1
.
$
+
-
-
 
$
+
-
/
#
$
+
-
-
/
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
$
+
-
-
-
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
 
,
+
$
$
$
<
=
=
>
?
?
@
A
?
@
=
?
>
B
C
D
E
=
'
D
H
G
„
»
I
‹
I￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
!
￿
￿
"
￿
￿
#
%
$
’
&
￿
(
*
)
+
￿
￿
,
.
-
/
(
￿
,
1
0
3
2
%
￿
5
4
￿
(
6
￿
￿
7
9
8
￿
￿
￿
￿
:
#
;
0
<
(
￿
-
=
￿
>
￿
 
?
￿
@
￿
,
A
￿
￿
(
B
@
￿
￿
4
￿
(
B
#
;
0
3
￿
￿
C
B
￿
￿
(
B
#
E
D
F
#
￿
$
￿
￿
H
G
"
I
J
￿
K
￿
M
L
O
N
P
￿
￿
0
3
￿
;
Q
&
R
,
3
(
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
0
S
U
T
￿
￿
V
￿
+
￿
W
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
"
￿
 
￿
X
Y
￿
Z
\
[
^
]
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
X
Y
+
Z
\
[
^
]
2
%
(
B
_
‘
(
￿
C
￿
￿
:
#
￿
￿
￿
(
B
@
%
￿
V
6
a
M
b
c
V
d
e
￿
d
 
f
g
d
￿
h
:
i
d
 
f
j
i
l
k
;
m
d
 
f
￿
h
:
i
￿
n
e
￿
d
 
f
g
d
￿
d
B
m
d
 
f
g
d
B
￿
￿
m
d
 
f
g
d
;
o
￿
i
d
 
f
j
i
d
 
f
g
d
;
o
p
k
d
 
f
j
i
l
k
;
m
d
 
f
j
i
 
h
:
m
d
 
f
g
d
;
o
￿
￿
d
 
f
￿
h
:
i
￿
q
d
 
f
j
i
￿
￿
B
o
d
 
f
r
k
d
 
f
j
i
B
o
l
d
d
 
f
j
n
￿
s
￿
i
d
 
f
j
m
 
h
:
q
d
 
f
j
i
B
o
￿
q
d
 
f
j
n
￿
d
￿
d
d
 
f
j
￿
￿
d
B
i
d
 
f
j
s
d
 
f
j
m
￿
i
 
h
d
 
f
j
m
￿
q
￿
d
d
 
f
j
q
l
k
;
￿
d
 
f
j
m
￿
d
B
s
d
 
f
j
m
￿
i
￿
i
d
 
f
j
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
d
 
f
j
q
d
 
f
t
o
￿
o
￿
n
d
 
f
j
q
 
h
:
q
d
 
f
j
￿
￿
q
 
h
d
 
f
t
o
￿
h
:
n
d
 
f
t
o
￿
i
￿
m
h
￿
f
g
d
￿
d
￿
d
h
d
 
f
j
￿
￿
￿
￿
m
h
￿
f
g
d
B
n
l
k
d
 
f
j
￿
￿
￿
￿
s
d
 
f
j
q
￿
q
l
k
d
 
f
j
q
￿
￿
l
k
h
￿
f
g
d
￿
d
￿
d
2
￿
￿
￿
0
u
￿
￿
,
3
(
￿
C
￿
￿
:
#
￿
￿
￿
(
B
@
￿
￿
V
￿
a
w
v
’
x
<
y
￿
z
{
V
￿
|
;
}
{
V
￿
~
d
 
f
j
i
d
 
f
g
d
B
s
￿
￿
d
 
f
j
i
l
k
6
o
d
 
f
j
i
 
h
:
i
d
 
f
g
d
;
o
￿
￿
d
 
f
￿
h
:
i
B
o
d
 
f
j
i
￿
q
￿
￿
d
 
f
r
k
d
 
f
j
i
￿
q
￿
i
d
 
f
j
n
B
o
￿
m
d
 
f
j
m
￿
n
￿
m
d
 
f
j
i
B
o
￿
s
d
 
f
j
n
￿
d
￿
d
d
 
f
j
q
￿
q
B
o
d
 
f
j
s
d
 
f
j
m
￿
i
￿
q
d
 
f
j
m
￿
q
￿
q
d
 
f
j
q
￿
m
￿
q
d
 
f
r
k
;
￿
￿
i
d
 
f
j
m
 
h
￿
d
d
 
f
j
￿
￿
￿
￿
s
d
 
f
j
q
d
 
f
t
o
￿
o
p
k
d
 
f
j
q
￿
i
￿
i
d
 
f
j
￿
B
o
￿
o
d
 
f
j
s
￿
￿
￿
s
d
 
f
t
o
￿
h
￿
h
h
￿
f
g
d
￿
d
￿
d
h
d
 
f
j
￿
￿
￿
￿
q
h
￿
f
g
d
￿
k
;
i
d
 
f
j
￿
￿
￿
￿
s
d
 
f
j
q
￿
s
￿
n
d
 
f
j
q
B
o
￿
m
h
￿
f
g
d
￿
d
￿
d
￿
￿
￿
A
￿
￿
￿
U
￿
3
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
^
￿
￿
￿
l
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
A
￿
￿
￿
u
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
^
￿
￿
￿
*
￿
￿
t
￿
￿
￿
\
￿
￿
￿
j
￿
￿
j
￿
￿
￿
<
￿
￿
￿
t
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
M
￿
￿
F
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
t
￿
￿
3
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
p
￿
A
￿
￿
￿
￿
^
￿
￿
¡
%
¢
6
£
⁄
￿
^
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
¥
§
ƒ
￿
￿
￿
¤
F
￿
￿
'
g
“
H
￿
￿
ƒ
p
￿
￿
￿
‹
«
p
'
r
￿
￿
￿
￿
¥
J
￿
￿
'
g
￿
￿
￿
A
￿
￿
￿
￿
¥
￿
￿
^
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
P
ƒ
l
￿
A
￿
￿
￿
^
￿
›
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
F
￿
￿
¥
￿
ﬁ
￿
￿
￿
t
￿
￿
"
ﬂ
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
9
–
￿
￿
t
￿
￿
6
￿
M
￿
￿
F
￿
￿
￿
ﬂ
￿
￿
￿
†
"
‡
￿
·
￿
￿
¶
ﬂ
 
•
￿
‚
¶
ﬂ
B
„
‹
￿
￿
￿
￿
B
•
–
￿
￿
j
￿
”
†
"
»
￿
»
￿
…
U
‰
+
￿
￿
¿
•
u
￿
3
`
ﬁ
K
￿
￿
￿
ƒ
p
￿
￿
￿
^
«
l
'
r
￿
ˆ
￿
￿
¥
J
￿
￿
'
g
￿
￿
￿
A
￿
￿
'
g
￿
‹
￿
p
¥
”
˜
p
¥
§
￿
￿
￿
›
￿
p
'
g
¥
§
¤
F
￿
￿
￿
F
￿
￿
'
g
¥
§
￿
u
￿
U
￿
*
￿
￿
ƒ
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
*
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
M
“
‹
￿
3
￿
￿
'
j
￿
^
«
l
¯
g
￿
￿
￿
˘
￿
￿
j
￿
￿
1
˙
￿
￿
￿
￿
t
￿
`
￿
￿
￿
^
￿
l
￿
+
￿
￿
￿
”
¨
˚
￿
 
¸
+
￿
￿
¥
J
￿
￿
'
g
￿
￿
￿
3
￿
￿
'
j
￿
^
￿
l
¥
￿
￿
￿
￿
M
¤
￿
￿
‹
￿
￿
￿
￿
'
g
￿
:
˜
l
￿
^
˜
l
¥
￿
￿
p
￿
￿
ƒ
￿
￿
￿
￿
l
￿
p
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
“
^
￿
A
￿
￿
'
j
￿
^
«
p
¯
j
￿
￿
￿
p
￿
￿
j
￿
ﬁ
￿
˝
l
￿
A
￿
￿
￿
￿
˛
￿
￿
¥
J
￿
￿
'
g
￿
￿
￿
A
￿
￿
'
g
￿
^
￿
l
¥
￿
￿
ˇ
¥
§
ƒ
p
˜
p
￿
￿
'
g
￿
‹
˜
p
¥
￿
¤
F
￿
‹
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
^
￿
^
'
j
￿
^
￿
￿
￿
*
˜
l
￿
›
￿
R
—
￿
￿
^
¥
￿
￿
‹
￿
p
￿
p
￿
u
￿
1
￿
A
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
¤
￿
￿
‹
￿
›
￿
›
￿
^
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
^
¤
F
￿
￿
￿
A
￿
￿
￿
A
¥
￿
'
g
￿
‹
￿
p
￿
^
￿
￿
￿
u
￿
B
ﬁ
5
￿
￿
￿
U
￿
￿
￿
￿
¥
§
˜
p
¯
r
￿
￿
¥
￿
'
g
￿
<
￿
￿
￿
P
￿
￿
￿
A
«
l
¯
g
￿
￿
￿
A
￿
￿
￿
˛
￿
￿
￿
^
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
¤
￿
￿
‹
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
A
￿
‹
'
g
￿
‹
￿
K
¤
￿
￿
￿
￿
F
￿
›
¤
￿
'
g
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
ﬁ
￿
¢
”
￿
￿
ƒ
￿
￿
A
￿
§
￿
￿
￿
u
￿
R
￿
A
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
«
p
'
t
￿
A
¥
￿
￿
^
￿
p
￿
￿
￿
￿
¤
￿
￿
￿
￿
F
￿
›
¤
￿
'
g
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
%
￿
A
￿
l
￿
￿
￿
¤
￿
￿
‹
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
A
￿
‹
'
g
￿
‹
￿
U
¤
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
›
¤
￿
'
g
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
'
￿
ﬁ
￿
￿
‹
ﬁ
B
￿
.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
`
§
￿
^
Æ
K
￿
￿
￿
￿
˚
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
^
￿
”
￿
›
￿
u
￿
A
￿
P
¥
￿
￿
￿
˜
￿
￿
A
￿
￿
￿
￿
F
￿
§
￿
￿
￿
^
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
`
¶
￿
A
Æ
￿
`
￿
/
ª
¶
￿
￿
￿
M
￿
￿
F
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
§
￿
￿
˜
l
￿
￿
“
^
￿
^
¯
g
˜
l
￿
￿
￿
￿
¿
'
g
￿
U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
˚
￿
˛
￿
^
￿
l
￿
R
￿
￿
"
￿
^
•
￿
￿
:
•
￿
Ł
F
Ł
￿
Ł
u
•
￿
Æ
9
￿
'
r
￿
￿
K
Æ
.
￿
.
￿
¿
‹
¿
^
¿
'
g
¥
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
*
˜
p
￿
+
«
￿
￿
F
￿
6
￿
^
￿
p
￿
￿
￿
￿
ƒ
l
¯
g
'
g
¤
u
￿
3
￿
￿
'
j
￿
^
￿
l
¥
￿
ﬁ
˝
 
'
g
￿
￿
￿
^
¯
g
¯
r
—
￿
￿
￿
￿
%
￿
^
￿
l
￿
F
Ø
W
¥
§
'
j
￿
p
￿
u
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
/
Œ
J
￿
￿
¤
F
￿
￿
'
g
￿
^
￿
R
ƒ
*
￿
￿
￿
‹
«
l
￿
^
«
l
'
g
¯
g
'
r
￿
º
—
￿
￿
*
￿
￿
￿
l
￿
A
￿
￿
￿
u
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
9
￿
￿
￿
￿
'
g
¥
;
￿
￿
￿
￿
ƒ
￿
￿
^
￿
§
￿
￿
￿
u
￿
￿
￿
M
￿
'
g
¤
￿
'
g
¥
w
￿
*
￿
F
æ
￿
￿
p
￿
u
￿
￿
￿
^
¥
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
ƒ
p
￿
￿
￿
^
«
￿
￿
A
«
l
'
g
¯
g
'
g
￿
/
—
›
￿
￿
￿
3
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
M
￿
º
Ø
W
“
^
￿
^
¯
g
˜
l
￿
ˆ
'
g
¥
w
¯
t
￿
3
￿
￿
￿
‹
￿
F
￿
w
￿
￿
￿
^
￿
›
￿
￿
￿
￿
H
￿
^
￿
¤
F
￿
￿
'
r
￿
￿
'
g
¤
u
￿
A
¯
H
“
‹
￿
A
¯
g
˜
l
￿
￿
￿
ﬁ
ı
^
￿
￿
`
￿
￿
A
￿
M
￿
￿
F
￿
￿
￿
%
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
/
Œ
J
￿
￿
¤
F
￿
￿
'
g
￿
^
￿
K
ƒ
*
￿
￿
￿
‹
«
￿
￿
A
«
l
'
g
¯
g
'
r
￿
º
—
˚
˜
p
￿
￿
￿
*
￿
F
￿
ﬂ
P
￿
¿
'
g
¥
M
￿
￿
￿
˚
¥
§
'
g
￿
￿
￿
R
￿
^
￿
l
￿
￿
˜
l
￿
l
￿
p
￿
F
￿
ﬂ
‘
ł
￿
¿
￿
￿
￿
˚
ƒ
￿
￿
￿
￿
F
￿
u
ﬁ
G
 
￿
W
￿
￿
￿